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Alabama 
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Russellville Gas Co. v. Duggar. 260 So.2d 393 (Ala. Civ. App. ), £ert ., 
395 (Ala. 1971) ("The injury must have had its origin in some risk incident 
Such risk is incident to the employment when it is connected with the dutu being 
performed under the obligations of such employment " A slip and fall injury on the 
claimant's home driveway was not compensable). 
u bo .':d 
einplo\nu 
'going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: Lauderdale County Coop . Inc. v. Shook, 376 So.2d 199 (Ala. Civ App 1979) (Where 
the employee is acting in a dual capacity and the employer derives a benefit from his 
actions, an injury having its origin in such act may be found to have arisen out of and in the 
course of employment). 
A- l 
Alaska Stat. §23.30.395 (2) (1998). 
**The definition of "arising out of and in the course of employment" expressly excludes 
"activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities." 
**The statute also provides for a presumption in favor of the employee. Alaska Stat. 
§23.30.120 (2) (1998). 
Northern Corp. v. Saari. 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1972) (Travel from to and from a report 
work camp to a recreational facility was found to be work-related. Notably, the Alaska 
statute expressly covers employer-required travel to a remote job site). 
Marsh v. Alaska Workman's Comp. Bd.. 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978) (Assault on 
bartender by customer did not result from work-connected activities. The activity must be 
"reasonably foreseeable and incidental" to the employment, and not just "but for" the 
employment.). 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel 813 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1991) (adopting 
the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Anchorage Roofing Co.
 r Inc. v. Gonzales. 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973) (recognizing the 
dual purpose rule for a mixed business and personal trip). 
Anderson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1966) 
(Recreational activities at a remote site are in the interest of the employer as well as the 
employee and will therefore be considered within the course of employment). 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
A-2 
Arizona 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1021 (1998). 
Gaumer v. Industrial Comm'n. 382 P.2d 673 (Ariz. 1963) ("Where an injury is suffered 
by an employee while engaged in acts for his own purposes or benefit (other than acts 
necessary for his own personal comfort and convenience while at work ) such injury 
is not in the course of his employment."). 
Peterson v. Industrial Comm'n. 490 P.2d 870 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (The employee's 
suffocation death which occurred during the traveling employee's sleep at a rooming 
house was compensable since a reasonable period of sleep is necessarily incidental to the 
work of a traveling employee required to take overnight lodging away from home). 
Poole v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (The benefit to the 
employer from having the employee on call, was insufficient to apply the substantial 
benefits exception to the going and coming rule for an injury from an automobile accident 
while returning home from the personal errand of getting a haircut). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Gonzales v. Industrial Comm'n. 531 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) ("[WJhere an 
employee, on his lunch hour, without the consent or knowledge of the employer, takes the 
employer's equipment to accomplish a task solely for his personal benefit, the fact that his 
activity might incidentally benefit the employer does not establish that he was within 
the course of his employment"). 
Edwards v. Industrial Comm'n. 385 P.2d 219 (Ariz. 1963) (The employee's accidental 
drowning during swimming at hotel during a business trip was not an "an incident to his 
work or in any way associated with it."). 
Loveless v. Industrial Comm'n. 432 P.2d 600 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (An injury sustained 
by a an employee who was on duty 24 hours a day as a watchman was non-compensable 
when his son accidentally discharged a firearm belonging to the claimant [and supplied by 
the employer], because the claimant's activity was personal in nature"). 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
A-3 
Arkansas 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Peetz v. Industrial Comm'n. 604 P.2d 255 (Ariz. 1979) (claimant's injury from accidental 
shooting while demonstrating the gun's safety devices to his wife, did not arise out of 
employment but a personal activity). Accord D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps, v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 630 P.2d 58 (Ariz. 1981). 
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (1998). 
Coleman's Bar-B-Oue v. Fuller. 559 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1978). 
American Red Cross v. Hogan. 681 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. App. 1985). 
Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding. 908 S.W.2d 666 (Ark. App. 1995) (Some 
nexus between the employment and travel must be present. This is not met merely by 
travel in a company vehicle or by the voluntary delivery of a paycheck.). 
American Red Cross v. Wilson. 519 S.W.2d 60 (Ark. 1975) (A slip and fall on a home 
stairway while obtaining Christmas decorations stored at the employee's home and used at 
local nursing homes by the claimant's employer was found to be compensable .). 
Robbins v. Jackson. 339 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1960) (The "concurrent benefit" rule cannot be 
applied to circumvent the necessity of first showing the injury arose out of and in the 
course of employment.). 
A-4 
California 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Cal. Lab. Code § 3600 (West 1998). 
Ralphs Grocery Co. V. W.C.A.B. 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (Fatal 
heart attack following telephone conversation with employer while at home did not arise 
while employee was performing a service incidental to his employment. "Although 
'liability under the compensation law has been extended to cover personal acts necessary to 
the comfort, convenience and welfare of the employee,' that exception has been limited to 
instances where 'the employee at the time of injury was at work and either on the 
employer's premises or on a business errand.'"). 
Ralphs Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997). 
Wilson v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.. 545 P.2d 225 (Ca. 1976) (Transporting work-related 
materials in employee's car does not make the travel work-related. "Such cartage is 
common and must be viewed as incident to commute rather than as part of the 
employment.") (emphasis added). 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n. 247 P.2d 697 (Ca. 1952) (injury 
sustained during employee's recreational activity beyond property controlled by employer 
was not sustained in the course of or incidental to his employment). 
A-5 
Colorado 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-41-301B Ann. (West 1998). 
University of Denver v. NemethT 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (recognizing the 
general personal comfort rule). 
University of Denver v. Nemeth. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (finding that 
playing football was incidental to the student's employment with the university because 
the facts showed that the university required those who held the job and received free 
meals to engage in football under the penalty of losing the job and meals). 
Younger v. City and County of Denver. 810 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1991) (An injury "arises 
out of' employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and 
obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position he was injured). 
Accord Stamper v. Hiteshew. 797 P.2d 784 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). 
Brogger v. Kezer. 626 P.2d 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (An injury from a fall off of a 
ladder while painting a home which was also used as the company's office was 
compensable.). 
A-6 
Connecticut 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
'going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-275 and 31-284 (West 1997). 
Iliff v. Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co.. 16 A.2d481 (Conn. 1940). 
Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co.. 694 A.2d 1230 (Conn. 1997) (eating in the lunch 
hour and other personal acts while on the employer's premises are incidental to 
employment). 
McNamara v. Town of Hamden. 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1979) (An activity is 
incidental to employment "if the activity is regularly engaged in on the employer's 
premises within the period of employment, with the employer's approval or 
acquiescence."). Accord Masko v. Board of Educ. of Wallingford. 710 A.2d 825 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1998). 
McNamara v. Town of Hamden. 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1979) ("There is a crucial 
difference between the going and coming cases . . . and other types, because in the going 
and coming cases the injury has not occurred on the premises of the employer"). 
Spatafore v. Yale University. 684 A.2d 1155 (Comm. 1996) ("[I]n situations tangential to 
employment, 'the need arose to reach out for the additional element of employer benefit to 
make up for the fact that employees going to or coming from work do not satisfy the first 
two course-of-employment requirements, place and period of employment"). 
Tovish v. Gerber Electronics. 630 A.2d 136 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993), affid, 642 A.2d 721 
(Conn. 1994) (Shoveling driveway snow to remove an obstacle to the salesman's exit his 
home to visit customers was found to be incidental to employment. The dissent, however, 
found that the decedent's act of shoveling the driveway was a common homeowner's task 
performed in preparation for work.). 
A-7 
Delaware 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
19 Del. C. §2301 (15) (1998). 
The statute contains unique details in its definition of injuries arising out of and in the 
course of employment. 
Bedwell v. Brandywine Carpet Cleaners. 684 A.2d 302 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996) (employees 
are within the course and scope of employment while engaged in acts which minister to 
their personal comfort). 
19Del. C. § 2301 (15) (1998). 
Chickadel v. Davis. 1990 Del. Super LEXIS 342 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1990) (The claimant must 
have been furthering the interests of the employer at the time of accident. Alternatively, 
she must have been so employed and engaged in an activity she would be expected to 
perform at a time and place when and where she could have been expected to be. A 
personal errand during lunch does not satisfy this requirement). 
Storm v. Karl-Mil. Inc.. 460 A.2d 519 (Del. 1983) (dual purpose test not met). 
A-8 
Florida 
Fla Stat. ch. 440.02 (17), 440.09 (1998) 
City of St Petersburg v. Cashman. 71 So 2d 733 (Fla 1954) ("[A]n injury shall be deemed 
to have occurred in the course of "employment" if it is sustained by a workman, on the 
premises of his employer while preparing to begin the day's work or while doing 
other acts preparatory or incidental to the performance of his duties, which are reasonably 
necessary for such purpose ") 
Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets. 724 So 2d 1222 (Fla Dist Ct App 1998) (Injuries 
suffered by an employee in an automobile accident while traveling to work were not 
compensable The employee's preparation of a company newsletter at home did not make 
the home a second work-site Further, her delivery of the newsletter was "merely an 
incidental part of the trip She would not have made the drive if the personal motive 
(going to work) was removed ") 
other relevant or analogous case law: Vigliottiv K-Mart 680 So 2d 466 (Fla Dist Ct App 1996) (recognizing the application 
of the "premises rule" under the new statute), accord Perez v Public Supermarkets, Inc.. 
673 So 2d 938 (Fla Dist Ct App 1996) 
Heath v Thomas Lumber Co . 140 So 2d 805 (Fla 1962) (A Fatal heart attack from 
exertion while pruning an orange tree given to him by his employer was not compensable 
"Although decedent's employer may have received some vague or minute benefit from 
his work the sole purpose of such work was benefit to himself" No dual purpose was 
shown ) 
Glasser v. Youth Shop. 54 So 2d 686 (Fla 1951) (A slip and fall on a stairway at home 
was not compensable notwithstanding the fact that the employee was carrying work record 
books that he had been working on at home that morning ) 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment 
'going & coming" rule recognized 
A-9 
Georgia 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-1 (4) (1998). 
Murphy v. Ara Services. Inc.. 298 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (For an injury to 
arise out of work, "[t]he causative danger must be peculiar to the work . . . It must be 
incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master 
and servant."). 
Street v. Douglas County Road Department et aL 287 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). 
Avers v. Gulf Life Insurance Company. 81 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954) ("If in the 
performance of an act which he was directly employed to do, or an act reasonably 
necessary to be done in order to perform the act he was employed to do, the employee 
receives accidental injury, such injury is compensable. If the act does not come within 
either of these classifications, the injury is not compensable." The claimant failed to show 
that his duties specifically included a week-end trip with a prospective customer, or that 
the trip made was reasonably necessary to sell insurance.). Cf Martinson v. Industrial 
Commission, 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980). 
A-10 
Hawaii 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386-3 (a) (Michie 1999). 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386-85 (Michie 1999) (Statutory presumption in favor of the 
employee must be rebutted by substantial evidence from the employer). 
Pacheco v. Orchid of Hawaii. 502 P.2d 1399 (Hawaii 1972) (reasonable and necessary 
activities during work breaks are incidental to employment). 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co.. 881 P.2d 1246 (Hawaii 1994) (Incidental contains an 
element of the usual and reasonable both as to the needs to be satisfied and as to the means 
used to satisfy them.). 
Smith v. State Dept. of Labor and Indus.. 907 P.2d 101 (Hawaii 1995) ("going and 
coming" and "premises" rules expressly adopted). 
Zemis v. SCI Contractors, Inc.. 911 P.2d 77 (Hawaii 1996) (Hawaii has adopted a 
"unitary test" that considers whether there is a sufficient work connection to bring the 
accident within the scope of the statute. Injuries from an assault by a co-working arose 
from a purely personal dispute unrelated to work were not compensable even though the 
assault took place on the employers' premises.). 
Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co.. 881 P.2d 1246 (Hawaii 1994) (An activity that is best 
described as an incident of an activity that was itself an incident of employment is too far 
removed to be compensable.). 
A - l l 
relevant statutory provision Idaho Code §72-102 (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
O'Loughlin v. Circle A Construction. 739 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1987) (If the injury can be seen 
to have followed as a natural incident of the work, and to have been contemplated by a 
reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned 
by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out o f the employment. But it excludes 
an injury which can not fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate 
cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally 
exposed apart from the employment.). 
Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of Am.. 565 P.2d 1367 (Idaho 1977). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Eriksen v. Nez Perce County et al.. 235 P.2d 736 (Idaho 1951) (injuries while engaged in 
personal acts are not compensable). 
A-12 
Illinois 
relevant statutory provision 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 820, para. 305/1 (1999). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment. 
All Steel Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 582 N.E.2d 240 (111. App. 1991) (An employee going 
to the parking lot to warm his car during lunch break was reasonably necessary act of 
personal comfort which occurred in the course of his employment). 
Klug v. The Industrial Commission et aL 46 N.E.2d 38 (III 1943) (A risk is incidental to 
the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in 
fulfilling his contract of service. Upon arriving at a work site after lunch, the claimant's 
opening of a car door to lock up the car was not related to or incidental to any work she 
was required to perform in fulfilling her contract of service.). 
'going & coming" rule recognized: Burmeister v. Industrial Comm'n. 284 N.E.2d 625 (111 1972). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Mazursky v. The Industrial Commission et aL 4 N.E.2d 823 (III 1936) (An injury does 
not "arise out o f work when the employee, while on the employer's premises, is engaged 
in an activity for his own personal benefit.). 
Loyola University v. The Industrial Commission et aL 96 N.E.2d 509 (III 1951) (u[T]he 
injury is compensable if received while the employee is doing those reasonable things 
which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do. . . . Was it 
part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused the 
injury?" Whether an act is reasonably contemplated by the employment is to be 
determined by considering among other facts, the nature of the act, the nature of the 
employment, and the terms of the contract of employment.). 
A-13 
Indiana 
relevant statutory provision Ind. Code § 22-3-6-1 (e) (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Morgan. 494 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("Risks 
incidental to and deemed arising out of employment include acts of employees which are 
reasonably necessary to their life, comfort or convenience, even though such acts are 
technically not acts of service."). 
Accord Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey. 427 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Segally v. Ancervs. 486 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Morgan. 494 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) 
(traveling employee engaged in a purely personal errand will not be compensable). 
Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey. 427 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (employee 
stabbed in motel room by co-worker covered by traveling employee doctrine). 
Segally v. Ancerys. 486 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("In cases where accidents occur 
away from the employer's premises, the Act applies only to employees who have been 
engaged in activities which are found to be , in some material respects, incidental to 
employment or beneficial to the employer. The pivotal question in cases arising under 
the Act is whether or not the employee's exposure to the hazard which caused injury 
was increased by reason of employment."). 
A-14 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
Iowa Code §85.61 (1997). 
Miedema v. The Dial Corporation. 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). 
2800 Corp. v. Fernandez. 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Hanson v. Reichelt 452 N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 1990) (Actual risk doctrine adopted. "If the 
nature of the employment exposes the employee to risk of such an injury, the employee 
suffers an accidental injury arising out of and during the course of the employment"). 
A-15 
relevant statutory provision Kan Stat Ann. §§44-501 and 44-508 (1993 & Supp 1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
See generally Repstine v Hudson Oil Co.. 126 P 2d 225 (Kan 1942) (The employee's 
carrying money from filling station home with him at night was not sufficient make his 
travel work-related "The fact that the employee happened to be doing something 
incidental to or in connection with his work does not mean that the accident which 
happened to him arose 'out of his employment ") 
Tompkins v. George Rinner Construction Co.. 398 P 2d 578 (Kan 1965) (dual purpose 
test) 
Thompson v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co.. 367 P 2d 72 (Kan 1961) (Salesman hit his 
head in the garage as he traveled inside from his car to make a business call Held not 
compensable because the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment) 
A-16 
Kentucky 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §342.0011(1) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
Blue Diamond Coal Co. V. Walters. 287 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1956) (Acts necessary for 
comfort and convenience of the employee while at work, though strictly personal to 
himself and not acts of service are incidental to the service.). 
Brown v. Olwsley . 564 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1978) (travel from home to the place of 
employment is not performing some service for the employer). 
Cf Kaycee Coal Co. v. Mary M. Short. 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1970) (when the home 
becomes a work site, travel from the home to another work site is covered as travel 
between two places of employment). 
Meem Haskins Coal Co. v. Jent 108 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1937) (dual purpose test used to 
analyze an injury which occurred during the employee's permissive use of a company 
machine shop to make a repair to personal property). 
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Louisiana 
relevant statutory provision La. Rev. State Ann. § 23:1031 (West 1998). 
"incidental" to employment Mitchell v. Brookshire Grocery Co.. 653 So.2d 202 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (A slip and fall 
defined in terms of the "personal injury in the employer's parking lot is compensable since the working day embraces 
comfort" doctrine: reasonable intervals before and after work "just as it embraces reasonable periods of rest, 
relaxation, and attendance to personal needs."). 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: May v. Sisters of Charity. 651 So.2d 375 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
Wilson v. City Shreveport. 682 so.2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the special 
mission exception). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Guaglino v. Ace Bakery Div. Of Lakeland Bakery, Inc.. 275 So.2d 874 (La. Ct. App. 
1973) (the electrocution death of a bakery manager using a blower belonging to the 
employer to blow off grass clippings from his driveway was not compensable). 
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Maine 
relevant statutory provision Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A § 201 (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
Cf Moore v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, et aL 669 A.2d 156 (Me. 1995) (When "an 
employee in the course of his employment uses a restroom whose condition is a cause of 
an injury to the employee, the injury arises out of the employment"). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Comeau v. Maine Costal Services, et aL 449 A.2d 362 (Me. 1982) ("The crucial question 
is whether a sufficient work-connection has been exhibited so as to justify an award of 
compensation under a liberal interpretation of this remedial Act." The court finds that a 
"somewhat tenuous" employment relationship will not satisfy this standard" and affirms 
the denial of compensation. Nevertheless, the concurring opinion criticizes the majority 
opinion's adoption of the equivalent of the "quantum theory" of work-connection, finding 
that this theory enormously expanding the parameters of the work-connection test). 
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Maryland 
Md Code Ann , Labor and Employment § 9-101 (1998) 
Spencer v Chesapeake Paperboard Co . 47 A 2d 385 (Md 1946) (an injury during a rest 
period was considered incidental to the employment) 
Blake Construction Co.. et al v. Wells. 225 A 2d 857 (Md 1967) ("The causative danger 
must be incidental to the nature of the business, and not independent of the relation of 
master and servant [I]t is not the purpose of the workman's compensation Act to 
impose upon the employer the obligation of a general insurer ") 
Miller, et al. v. Coles. 194 A 2d 614 (Md 1963) (injuries from a bar fight were not 
incident to employment as an equipment salesman, but were incident to being evicted, even 
though claimant alleged that he was at the bar to meet a customer) 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Morris v Board of Educ. 663 A 2d 578 (Md 1995) 
other relevant or analogous case law Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio. 551 A 2d 135 (Md 1985) (There was no evidence the 
employer required the employee to perform work at home Thus, "dual purpose" 
exception to the going and coming rule was found inapplicable ) 
Sica v Retain Credit Co.. 227 A 2d 33 (Md 1967) (Recreational or social activities may 
be in the course of employment if a work relationship is established by variety of facts 
The standard is similar to that adopted by the Utah court in Black ) 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment 
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Massachusetts 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Mass. Gen. L. ch.152, § 26 (1998). 
Kubera's Case. 69 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1946). 
D'Angeli's Case. 343 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1976) (emergency public service may be 
warranted in the course of employment and found incidental to employment). 
Frassa v. Caulfield. 491 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. App. 1986) (going and coming rule not 
applicable to employee without a fixed place of employment). 
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Michigan 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 17.237(301). 
The code expressly adopts the tenets of "premises rule" and expressly provides that an 
"injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or 
recreational is not covered under the act." 
** The great majority of the case law in Michigan refers to the former section which was 
replaced in 1985. All annotations to these cases are solely to the Michigan reporter. 
Camburn v. Northwest Sch.. 559 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. App. 1996) (the special mission 
exception was not applicable to a teacher injured in an automobile accident on her way to 
a seminar since the employer was not directly benefitted by employee's attendance and 
attendance was neither compulsory nor definitely expected). 
Owenv. Chrysler Corp.. 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ("[M]oving the car into 
the garage for purposes of placing a suitcase in the car was at most preparation for the 
eventuality of travel. The activity was not within the scope of the special mission so as to 
support an award of compensation."). 
White v. Public Service Comm'n. 61 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 1953) (the fact that the 
Commissioner took work home with him would not establish that his transportation to and 
from home was incident to and a part of his employment). 
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Minnesota 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
'going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
Minn. Stat. § 176.011 (1998). 
Williams v. Hoyt Const. Co.r Inc.. 237 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1976) ("personal benefit" 
rule). Schneppmna v. T & E Service, Inc.. 177 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1970) ("personal 
benefit" rule not applicable to off-duty employee on the employer's premises). 
Weidenbach v. Miller. 55 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1952) (when an employee, without either 
express or implied instructions from his employer, voluntarily performs services for a third 
party, his actions are not incidental to employment). 
Brusven v. Ballord. 14 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1944) (injury from an accident during off hours 
in an on-site residence were not incidental to employment, but arose from personal risks). 
Thompson v. George E. Thompson Co.. 270 N.W. 594 (Minn. 1936) (an injury suffered 
while installing a storm window on the family home, which was also used as the principal 
place of business, was not incidental to the corporation's business). 
McConville v. City of St. Paul. 528 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1995). 
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Mississippi 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment. 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7 (1998). 
Quitman Knitting Mill v. Smith. 540 So.2d 623 (Miss. 1989) (reaction to cold tablet 
purchased from employer was reasonably incident of employment). 
Wilson v. Service Broadcasters, Inc.. 483 So.2d 1339 (Miss. 1986) (compensability based 
upon the application of an exception to the going and coming rule which made the travel 
from home work-related). 
Persons v. Stokes. 76 So.2d 517 (Miss. 1954) (An eye injury from a richoeting pellet from 
gun shot at a treed squirrel was not compensable. "The employer did not require, foster, 
or encourage the hunting of squirrels by his employees while on the job." ). 
Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready. 65 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1953) (Employee-housewife 
who had regularly performed bookkeeping services at night in her home living room 
suffered a compensable injury when, while moving a gun off of the couch, she suffered a 
shotgun amputation of her left thumb. Employee was found to be in the act of engaging in 
the work on her books when she was injured.). 
**The court was equally divided on the issue of whether the employee's injury arose "in 
the course o f her employment. The dissenting judge declared, "This is just too fantastic," 
finding: 
Mrs. Ready undertook to move the gun as house-keeper — not as 
bookkeeper. It was not necessary to remove the gun to do the book work. 
She could have utilized several other seating places. Of course, as a 
housekeeper she would have removed the gun from the couch the moment 
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she saw it there . . . Mrs. Ready was not merely removing the gun from the 
sofa and laying it aside - but she said her purpose was to place it in the 
closet where it usually stayed. She was acting as a housekeeper — not a 
bookkeeper — in doing that. 
Id. There was no discussion of the employee's activity being "incidental" to her 
employment. 
Earnest v. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co.. 119 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1960) 
(distinguishing Ready and concluding that an injury from a shotgun accidentally discharged 
while the traveling insurance salesman was "killing time" waiting for a customer was not 
compensable). 
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Missouri 
relevant statutory provision Mo. Rev. State. § 287.020 (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
Fingers v. Mount Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) 
("[0]ur appellate courts have ruled as compensable injuries received by fixed-hour 
employees while engaged in various personal activities on the employers' premises."). 
Byhee v. Ozark Airline. 706 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (going to fill the tires of 
a personal vehicle while on the company parking lot was incidental to employment). 
Cherry v. Powdered Coatings. 897 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (moving a 
personal vehicle in the employer's parking lot pursuant to the employer's instructions 
was incidental to employment). 
other definition of "incidental" Yaffe v. St. Louis Children's Hosp.. 648 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1982) ("An employee's 
to employment: injury occurs in the course of employment if the injury is the result of an activity which is 
reasonably incidental to the conditions or performance of her work and the employer 
could have reasonably anticipated it.. . . the focus is on the mutual benefit to the 
employer and employee." A volunteer workers' shopping in the employer's gift shop is 
where the employee is granted a discount is incidental to employment). 
Fingers v. Mount Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) 
(an employee who resides on the employer's premises and is subject to 24-hour call, must 
still demonstrate that the activity he was engaged in was work-related rather than personal 
in order to be in the course of employment). 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Donzelot v. Park Drug Co.. 239 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1951). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Shannon v. St. Louis Board of Education. 577 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) 
(applying the mutual benefit or dual purpose rule, a teacher's fall while attending a 
class for the benefit of her employer was found to be compensable). 
Jemison v. Superior Auto Mall. 932 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (the dual 
purpose test was not met when an employee picked up a spray can of paint requested by 
his employer while out on a lunch break and personal interview). 
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Montana 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-407 (1998). 
Steffesv. 93 Leasing Co.. 580 P.2d 450 (Mont. 1978). 
Strickland v. State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund. 901 P.2d 1391 (Mont. 1995) 
(personal comfort doctrine did not provide coverage an employee on a personal errand off 
of the employer's premises). 
Heath v. Montana Municipal Insurance Authority. 959 P.2d 480 (Mont. 1998) (employee 
injured on public sidewalk adjacent to her employer's premises was not subject to any risk 
created by the employment). 
Barthule v. Karman. 886 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1994) (Controlling factors relied upon to 
determine a work-related injury include: (1) whether the activity was undertaken at the 
employer's request; (2) whether employer, either directly or indirectly, compelled 
employee's attendance at the activity; (3) whether the employer controlled or participated 
in the activity; and (4) whether both employer and employee mutually benefitted from the 
activity.). 
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Nebraska 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101 (1999). 
Chrisman v. Farmers Coop. Assoc. 140 N.W.2d 809 (Neb. 1966) (All acts reasonably 
necessary or incident to the performance of the work, including such matters of personal 
convenience and comfort, not in conflict with specific instructions, as an employee may 
normally be expected to indulge in, under the conditions of his work, are regarded as being 
within the scope or sphere of the employment." Working on a personal vehicle on the 
employer's premises, during the time of employment was permitted by the employer and 
thus incidental to claimant's work.). 
Accord Cannia v. Douglas County. 481 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1992) (j°gging while attending 
a jail management course was reasonably incidental to employment as it was encouraged 
as a part of the course). 
Reynolds v. School Dist.. 461 N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 1990). 
Hardin v. Moorman Manufacturing Co.: 140 N.W.2d 820 (Neb. 1966) (performing repairs 
on the traveling salesman's personal vehicle, although also used for business purposes, was 
not incidental to his employment). 
Rowan v. University of Neb.. 299 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1980) (an art professor's fall off a 
ladder while opening the window of a home studio was not compensable on the basis that 
the employer was not required to assume the risk incidental to the defective window in the 
private studio). 
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Nevada 
relevant statutory provision Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616C. 150(1) (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky. 939 P.2d 1043 (Nev. 1997) (To arise out of 
employment "the injured party must establish a link between the workplace conditions and 
how those conditions caused the injury. A claimant must demonstrate that the origin of 
the injury is related to some risk involved within the scope of employment"). 
Heidtman v. Nevada Industrial Commission. 368 P.2d 763 (Nev. 1962) (the entry into an 
archery contest was a personal deviation from a claimed business trip). 
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New Hampshire 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §281-A:2 (V) (1987 & Supp. 1998). 
Cook v. Wickson Trucking Co.. Inc.. 600 A.2d 918 (N.H. 1991) (offering a ride to a 
stranded co-employee encountered on the road after work is simply too vague and 
attenuated a benefit to make the trip work related). 
Maheux v. Cove-Craftr Inc.. 164 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1960) (an injury while engaged in a 
personal activity which is reasonably undertaken and not expressly forbidden on the 
employer's premises is "in the course o f employment). 
Accord Hanchett v. Brezner Tanning Co.. 221 A.2d 246 (N.H. 1966) (An employee's 
death which occurred while repairing his personal vehicle in company shop was 
compensable. The court found that the employer did not forbid this activity and it was 
reasonably to be expected. Accordingly, it was an activity incidental to employment). 
Murphy v. Town of Atkinson. 517 A.2d 1170 (N.H. 1986) (an injury may be compensable 
if it occurred during an activity related to employment, which may include a personal 
activity if reasonably expected and not forbidden, or an activity of mutual benefit to 
employer and employee). 
Anheuser-Busch Co.r Inc. v. Pelletier. 641 A.2d 1018 (N.H. 1994) (to satisfy the mutual 
benefit theory, the employer must derive a substantial and direct benefit). 
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New Jersey 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
'going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:15-36 (1999). 
** The statute expressly provides that "when the employee is required by the employer to 
be away from the employer's placement of employment, the employee shall be deemed to 
be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance 
of duties assigned or directed by the employer." 
Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp.. 520 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1986) ("Injuries sustained 
within the scope of the work-period and the work-place while the employee was engaged 
in personally motivated, but customary, or reasonable activities"). 
Van Devander v. West Side M. E. Church. 160 A. 763 (N.J. 1932) (care of a dwelling 
house ordinarily falls upon the occupant, and an injury sustained while performing a 
maintenance duty is not incidental to the work, either directly or indirectly). 
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New Mexico 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
N. M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-19 (1998). 
Velkovitz v. Penasco Independent School District. 633 P.2d 695 (N.M Ct. App. 1980); 
overruled on other grounds, 633 P.2d 685 (N.M. 1980) ("A risk is 'incidental to the 
employment' only where the risk belongs to or is connected with what an employee must 
do in fulfilling her contract. . . . What is reasonably incident to the employment depends 
upon the practices permitted in the particular employment and on the customs of the 
employment environment generally." Skiing was not incidental to employment since it was 
not a practice of the claimant's employment as a teacher or sponsor of the school's 
students.). 
Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran. Barkoff and Stagnoner PA.. 636 P.2d 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1981) (the claim was denied on the basis it did not "arise out o f employment since the risk 
did not flow from the employment as a rational consequence"). 
Constantineau v. First Nat'l Bank. 810 P.2d 1258 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
Clemmer v. Carpenter. 648 P.2d 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (dual purpose rule). 
Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv.. 547 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1976) (scope of 
employment is determined from directs of employer). 
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New York 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 2 (7) (McKinney 1998). 
Bobinis v. State Ins. Fund. 653 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (The employee was 
struck by a car in a store parking lot during an errand on his way home. The employee's 
home was not a second site of employment. Further, the employee's claim that he stopped 
to purchase a pen for work was an insufficient work relationship.). 
Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth.. 626 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. 1995) (Special mission exception 
satisfied. It is not sufficient that an employee has "undertaken a personal errand that had 
some incidental work-related purpose." Rather, there must be "evidence of affirmative 
conduct by the employer soliciting or encouraging the errand."). 
Freebern v. North Rockland CD A. 410 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N. Y. App. Div. 1978) (The dual 
purpose test must be applied with caution to employees who have frequent occasion to 
carry home work of varying degrees of importance and substantiality. The going-and-
coming rule is not be subjected to a process of gradual erosion, through the device of 
finding some tidbit of work performed at home.). 
McCoy v. New York City Housing Auth.. 613 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("To 
be compensable the injury must be a natural consequence of the employee's duties before it 
can be said to arise out of employment, and there must be a causal relationship between 
the accident and the employment." A fatal automobile accident away from the work site 
did not arise out of and in the course of the workers' employment). 
De Jesus v. New York State Police. 467 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. App. Civ. 1983) ("There 
must be a nexus between the accident and the employment to invoke the benefits of the 
Workers' Compensation Law." This was not met by mere fact that the officer was subject 
to 24-hour recall). 
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North Carolina 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
'going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (1991). 
Cf Smith v. Dacotah Cotton Mills, Inc.. 230 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (injury 
during a break while on the public street was not compensable). 
Bell v. Dewey Brothers. Inc.. 72 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. 1952) (an injury while washing 
personal vehicle on the employer's premises is not compensable since it did not result from 
a risk incident to employment). 
Robbins v. Nicholson. 188 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. 1972) ("The injury must spring from the 
employment or have it origin therein, [citation omitted] The injury must come from a risk 
which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to the service 
when he entered the employment. It may be said to be incidental to the employment when 
it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment, or an extraordinary 
risk which is only indirectly connected with the service owing to the special nature of the 
employment."). 
Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co.. 349 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (an injury which 
occurred while the claimant was hanging plants in her home was not compensable although 
the employer had instructed the claimant to dispose of the plants and received an 
incidental benefit from her actions). 
Roman v. Southland Transportation Co.. 508 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) 
("Incidental to . . . may be defined as something contingent on or related to actual 
employment duties."). 
Brvan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assoc. 24 S.E.2d 751 (N.C. 1943). 
Sandy v. Stackhouse Inc.. 128 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 1962) (the risk must be incidental to the 
character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant). 
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North Dakota 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Brvan v. First Free Will Baptist Church. 147 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1966) (A minister's back 
injury while moving a stove from his employer's parsonage did not arise out of and in the 
course of his employment although the activity benefitted his employer. Rather, his back 
injury arose out of his performing an act personal to himself and his family.). 
N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-02 (11) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
Welch v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau. 31 N.W.2d 498 (N.D. 1948) 
(the claimant's errand to obtain required forms for his work was incidental to his other 
duties). 
O'Leaery v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau. 243 N.W. 805 ( 1932) (the essence 
of the dual purpose test is utilized). 
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Ohio 
relevant statutory provision Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01 (Anderson 1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
Inland Manufacturing Div.. General Motors Corp. v. Lawson. 240 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1967) ("Where a workman does such things as are usually and reasonably incidental 
to the work of the employer, including the taking of refreshment, rest and smoke, which 
are not forbidden by the employer and in so doing is injured, it cannot be said as a matter 
of law that the injury was received outside the course of his employment"). 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Ruckman v. Cubbv Drilling. Inc.. 689 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1998). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling. Inc.. 689 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1998) ("Totality of the 
circumstances' test to determine whether there exists a sufficient causal connection 
between injury and employment to justify a claimant's participation in the fund. That test 
requires primary analysis of the following facts and circumstances: '(1) the proximity of the 
scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer 
had over the scene of the accident, (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured 
employee's presence at the scene of the accident."'). Accord Lord v. Daugherty. 423 
N.E.2d (Ohio 1981). 
Hampton v. Trimble. 655 N.E.2d 432 (Ohio 1995) (traveling employee's slip and fall on 
their home driveway while walking from the car to the door was compensable since the 
claimant did not complete her travel until she reached the door of her home; ef "portal to 
portal" rule). 
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Oklahoma 
relevant statutory provision Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 3. (1998). 
"incidental" to employment Furr v. Wal-Mart. 966 P.2d 1193 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998). 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: Corbett v. Express Personnel. 936 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1997) (risks purely personal—namely 
those which are not reasonably connected with the claimant's employment—are not 
compensable). 
American Management Systems, Inc. v. Sheila Mae Burns. 903 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1995) (a 
claimant must proffer evidence of a causal nexus to an identified employment-related 
hazard). 
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Oklahoma 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §3.(1998). 
Furrv. Wal-Mart. 966 P.2d 1193 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998). 
Corbett v. Express Personnel. 936 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1997) (risks purely personal—namely 
those which are not reasonably connected with the claimant's employment—are not 
compensable). 
American Management Systems, Inc. v. Sheila Mae Burns. 903 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1995) (a 
claimant must proffer evidence of a causal nexus to an identified employment-related 
hazard). 
A-37 
Oregon 
relevant statutory provision Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005 (1997). 
"incidental" to employment Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes. 943 P.2d 197 (Or. 1997) ("By 'reasonably incidental to' 
defined in terms of the "personal employment, we include activities that are personal in nature — such as a telephone call 
comfort" doctrine: home or a brief visit with a co-worker — as long as the conduct bears some reasonable 
relationship to the employment and is expressly or impliedly allowed by the employer "). 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: Knishwita V, McPonakTs Restaurants of Oregon, Inc., 919 P.2d 465 (Or. 1996). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Gilmore v. Norpac Foods, Inc.. 867 P.2d 1373 (Or. 1994) (Oregon has adopted a unitary 
approach, in which "arising out o f and "in the course o f are two elements of a single 
inquiry, that is, whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is 
sufficient that the injury should be compensable.). 
Hansen v. State Accident Insurance Fund. 558 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (An injury 
to a part-time ski instructor while in a ski contest was not compensable. Any benefit 
accruing to the employer from the claimant's participation in the contest was only 
incidental at best). 
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Pennsylvania 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 411 (1) (Supp. 1999). 
Police v. W.C.A.B.. 694 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Commw. Ct), appeal den.. 719 A.2d 748 (Pa. 
1997). 
Knowles v. Parker Wylie Carpet Co.r Inc.. 195 A. 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937) ("Ordinarily, 
when an accident occurs to an employee off the employer's premises, there is no 
presumption that at the time of the accident he was in the course of his employment. The 
burden rests upon the claimant to prove . . . he was actually engaged in a furtherance of 
the business or affairs of his employer"). 
Jones v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. 489 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1985) (Portal to portal ruled applied to traveling employee. Thus a slip and fall on tthe 
claimant's sidewalk when she went from her car to her home was compensable.). 
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Rhode Island 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other dv aition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
i relevant or analogous case law 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28^29^2 (1998). 
Rico v. All Phase Electric Co.. 675 A.2d 406 (R.I. 1996) (adoption of the "premises rule," 
recognizing injuries in the employer's parking lot while entering work to be "incidental" to 
employment). 
Rico v. All Phase Electric Co., 675 A.2d 406 (R.I. 1996). 
D'Alessio v. State of Rhode Island, et aL 509 A.2d 986 (R.I. 1986) (Injury while 
attending to duties from a union meeting was found to be compensable because the union 
activities in this case were found to be beneficial to the employer. The court noted, 
however, that in some cases the benefit of a union activity to an employer may be so 
tenuous that recovery should be denied). 
Dawson v. A & H Mfg. Co.. 463 A.2d 519 (R.I. 1983) (Rhode Island applies the "actual 
risk" doctrine which requires the employee to show that the risk, even though common to 
the public, was in fact a risk of his employment) 
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South Carolina 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
S.C. Code. Ann. §42-1-160 (Law Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1998). 
Osteen v. Greenville County School Dist. 508 S.E.2d 21 (S.C 1998) ("The personal 
comfort doctrine aids a court in determining whether, and under what circumstances, 
entirely personal activities engaged in by an employee at work may be considered 
incidental to employment." The claimant's activity of filling a personal cooler with ice for 
a family picnic was found not to be a "natural incident" of her employment and thus non-
compensable.). 
Beam v. State Workmen's Compensation Fund. 200 S.E.2d 83 (S.C 1973) (travel at the 
request or in the interest of the employer is incidental to employment). 
Moore v. Family Service of Charleston County. 237 S.E.2d 84 (S.C 1977) (injury from 
fall on home stairway while carrying four volumes of professional books was compensable 
since the employee was engaged in a special mission for her employer). 
Camp v. Spartan Mills. 3396 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. App. 1990). 
Leopard v. Blackman-Uhler. 458 S.E.2d 41 (S.C. 1995) (claimant's injury during voluntary 
company Softball game held off-premises and after work was not compensable 
notwithstanding the fact that the employer supplied the uniforms with a company logo, the 
equipment, paid the league dues and published the results of the games in the local 
newspaper). 
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South Dakota 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
oiber definition of "incidental" 
tc errr o^  merit' 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
S D. Codified Laws §62-1-1(7) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
The statute expressly provides that "No injury is compensable unless the employment or 
employment related activities are a major contributing cause of the condition 
complained of" 
Lang v. Board of Education N W.2d 695 (S.D. 1945) (travel from home where he had 
commenced his work to the • ool where he was to continue his work was incidental to 
employment) 
-~z\ Board of Education. 17 N W 2d 695 (S.D. 1945) (discussed generally) 
Roberts v. Stell. 367 N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985) ("[A]n employee is within the course of his 
employment if what he is doing is naturally related or incidental to his employment or he is 
doing that which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes." The court 
rejected claimant's assertion that since she lived on the premises and ate her meals there, 
grocery shopping was "naturally related or incidental" to her employment) 
A-42 
relevant statutory provision Tex. Labor Code Ann. §401.011 (10) (1998). 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance v. Rodriguez. 953 S.W.2d 765 (Tex Ct. App. 
1997) (An injury while tossing a football on the employer's premises during a brief 
work break was compensable. The language used by the court in its analysis is similar 
to the personal comfort doctrine.). 
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Confer. 956 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) 
(applying the dual purpose test to an errand by the employee on his way home). 
other relevant or analogous case law: Blockwell v. Harris County. 909 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (two tests to 
determine if an injury may be classified as one sustained in the course of employment: (1) it 
must of a kind or character originating in or having to do with the employer's work; and 
(2) it must have occurred while the individual was engaged in the furtherance of the 
employer's business or affairs"). 
Loyd v. Texas Employers Ins. Assoc. 280 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1955) (The employee, while 
on call, slipped off a ladder while painting the side of his house when he went to answer 
the phone. Injuries were not sustained in the course of employment notwithstanding the 
employee's claim that he was going to answer the phone at the time of the accident 
because of his on-call status. The court noted that the call could have been purely personal 
or even a wrong number.). 
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Vermont 
-elevant statutory provision 
"ineidentar to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other i m m of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Vt Stat Ann Tit 21 § 618 (1998). 
Kenney v. Rockingham Sch. Dist.. 190 A.2d 702 (Vt. 1963) (A slip-and-fall injury suffered 
by a home economics teacher while leaving an evening community education class was 
compensable since it was undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests 
The court specifically noted that "it must be kept in mind that this was an injury sustained 
at the work-situs" after doing something of mutual benefit to herself and her employer ) 
Rae v. Green Mountain Boys Camp. 175 A.2d 800 (Vt. 1961) (the gratuitous act of 
holding the reigns of an individual the claimant was requesting to act as a voluntary judge 
for his employer was reasonably part of his mission upon which he had been sent by the 
employer.). 
Holmquist v. Mental Health Services. Etc.. 420 A.2d 108 (Vt. 1980) (an employee's 
attendance at a meeting away from the work premises was within the course of 
employment as it was encouraged by the employee's supervisor, of mutual benefit to the 
employer, and undertaken in good faith.) 
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Virginia 
Va Code Ann § 65 2-101 (Michie 1998) 
Kraf Constr Servs . Inc. v Ingram. 437 S E 2d 424 (Va (1993) (an employee seeking to 
quench his thirst at a place provided by the employer is within the employment) 
Jones v Colonial Williamsburg Found . 382 S E 2d 300 (1989) (the employee's personal 
activity of throwing away trash, while the employer's premises, was incidental to 
employment) 
Kendrickv Nationwide Homes, Inc.. 355 S E 2d 347 (1987) (an employee going to and 
from the place where work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any service 
growing out of and incidental to his employment) 
other relevant or analogous case law: Lucas, et al v Lucas, et al. 186 S E 2d 63 (Va 1972) (Virginia employs the "actual risk" 
test which requires only that the employment expose the workman to the particular danger 
from which he was injured, notwithstanding the exposure of the public generally to like 
tasks An accident while performing a special errand undertaken at the approval of the 
employer is compensable ) 
Hill City Trucking. Inc v Christian. 385 S E 2d 377 (Va 1989) (Under the "actual risk" 
test, an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate 
cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally 
exposed apart from the employment is not compensable Injuries incurred during a truck 
robbery were not compensable because there was no evidence that the employment 
contributed to the risk ) 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
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Washington 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to empi« 
defined in terms of ! ^ 1 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition oi ..xiueniai 
to employment: 
"going & comii rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law: 
1998 Wash Legis. Serv § 51.08.013 (West). 
** Unlike most other states, Washington's worker's compensation act does not possess 
an "arising out of employment" requirement. 
Pept. Of Labor v. Johnson, 928 P.2d 1138 (Wa. Ct. App. 1997) (An injury at home 
while on administrative leave was not incidental to employment. The court chose to 
focus narrowly on the specific activity performed by the claimant at the time of the 
injury.). 
Ackley-Bell v. Seattle School District No. 1, 940 P.2d 685 (Wa. Ct. App. 1997) ("A 
worker is 'acting in the course of employment when 'acting at his or her employer's 
direction or in the furtherance of his or her employer's business." An injury incurred 
while attending collective bargaining negotiations was compensable.). 
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West Virginia 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (1998). 
Barkley v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r. 266 S.E.2d 456 (W.Va. 1980). 
Bilchak v. SWCC. 168 S.E.2d 723 (W.Va. 1969) (an injury to an employee while going to 
or from work while not on the premises is not compensable unless such place of injury is 
brought in the course of and as a result of his employment). 
Emmel v. State Compensation Director, et aL 145 S.E.2d 29 (W.Va. 1965) ("[I]t is not 
enough to say that the activity in which the injury occurred was a vague incident of 
employment." The court cautioned against liberalizing the interpretation of "in the course 
of employment to the point that the words are rendered meaningless). 
Jenrett v. Smith. 315 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1983) ("dual purpose" test adopted and used to 
evaluate immunity from tort liability of co-employee). 
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Wisconsin 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine; 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
MS Slat ; 102 o: (1998). 
Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, et aL 559 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. 1997) (taking a personal phone 
call was incidental to employment). 
Applied Plastics, Inc., et al. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, et al.. 359 N W 2d 
168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (in evaluating whether the injury arose out of an act which was 
incidental to employment, the court asked whether "the 'obligations or conditions' of 
employment create the 'zone of special danger1 out of which the injury arose"). 
Wis. Stat § 102.02 (3) (1998). 
Black River Dairy Products. Inc. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor & Human Relations. 207 
N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (A traveling salesman slipped and fell while walking from his back 
door of his home to his truck When an employee has a duty to travel as a part of his 
employment, his work commences as soon as he leaves his home and starts for the first 
place at which he is to perform work). 
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Wyoming 
relevant statutory provision 
"incidental" to employment 
defined in terms of the "personal 
comfort" doctrine: 
other definition of "incidental" 
to employment: 
"going & coming" rule recognized: 
other relevant or analogous case law 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102 (xi) (1998). 
Western Power Service & Construction v. Van Matre. 657 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1983) 
(payment of a per diem allowance was insufficient to make travel a part of the 
employment). 
Haagensen v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div.. 949 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 
1997) (A causal connection exists between the employee's injury and the course of 
employment when "there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, 
environment or requirement of the employment." This was not met when restaurant 
employee was injured after remaining on employer's premises 2 Vi to 3 hours after shift 
ended.). Cf Walls v. Industrial Common. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Stuckey v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div.. 890 P.2d 1097 (Wyo. 
1995) (nexus between the injury and employment not satisfied when employee injured 
during personal use of the county shop). 
State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Espinoza. 924 P.2d 979 (Wyo. 
1996) (claimant's momentary horseplay insufficient to break nexus to employment for on 
premises injury). 
Cronk v. Citv of Cody, et al.. 897 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1995) (Insufficient nexus to 
employment. Off-duty gym workout of a policy officer, while beneficial to the 
employment, was not required by the employer. "[I]f an employer does not require its 
employees to engage in such activities as a condition of employment, then those activities 
A-50 
cannot be in the course of employment"). 
Hepp v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div.. l n 
(Wyo. 1999) (Injury from a horseback riding incident, which took 
owned or controlled by the employer, did not s a sufficient 
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j
 . So It :,ake fit-' Utah, on December 2, 
1997 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
converted to an attorneys conference, at the 
request of the attorneys. 
BEFORF: 
APPEARANCES: The petition«~ 
Attorney . 
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The respondents were repress 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim, for perma nent total disability 
benefits associated with a January 13, 1997 fall on, i ce, resulting 
ill quadriplegia. The only issue to be resolved is the question of 
whether on not the petitioner had a compensable industrial injury 
on January 13, 1997. The petitioner has claimed that, at the time 
of the fall, he was performing a duty .incidental to his work 
responsibilities and thus his accident entitles him to workers 
compensation benefits. The respondents argue that the petitioner 
was not performing work duties when he was injured, but rather was 
merely salting his driveway, a normal homeowner activity. At the 
time of the hearing, the attorneys indicated that they were in 
basic agreement with the facts of the fall, and only had 
differences on what result was appropriate when the law was applied 
to the facts. As a result, the attorneys requested that the 
hearing be canceled and requested that they be allowed to present 
the competing legal arguments in written briefs to be submitted 
post-hearing. The ALJ agreed to allow this manner of presenting 
the case, A briefing scheduled was set up, at the time of the 
meeting on December 2, 1997. The briefing was completed as of 
January 30, 1998, when the matter was considered ready for 
decision. 
ORDER 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The relevant facts are stated in the briefs submitted by the 
parties. The ALJ will recite just those facts essential to the 
ALJ's decision to follow. 
As of January 30, 1997, the date of injury, the petitioner 
was employed by AE Clevite, as a traveling sales representative. 
He earned $36,500.00 per year in this position, at that time, and 
had a wife, and no minor dependent children. The only place of 
employment that the petitioner utilized was his home office. The 
petitioner had a separate room in his home that he used as his 
office. In that room, the petitioner had a computer, a printer, a 
phone, and an answering machine, all of which were provided to him 
by his employer. He also had numerous catalogs and price lists 
provided by the employer in that room. The employer had set up a 
separate phone line to the petitioner's office as well. The 
employer also provided the petitioner with a car, which he used to 
travel to various locations to service customers. The petitioner 
worked exclusively out of his home and had no central office to 
which he reported. The petitioner received all his business mail 
and packages at his home. 
On January 30, 1997, the petitioner had done some work 
traveling, apparently locally, to service some customers. He then 
returned to his home, to prepare for a business trip he was to take 
two days later. He loaded his car with the necessary lists and 
catalogs and other items that he needed for the trip. The 
petitioner was waiting to receive a display that he needed to take 
with him. That display was to be delivered to his home, either by 
regular mail or some other delivery system (i.e. UPS, etc.). The 
petitioner had spoken with the individual responsible for sending 
him the display and understood that the display was to be delivered 
to him at some time on January 30, 1997. After completing loading 
his car, the petitioner became aware that the mail carrier was 
close by. This caused the petitioner to be concerned about his 
steep driveway and the fact that the surface might be icy. He 
therefore went and retrieved a large bag of salt and proceeded to 
broadcast the salt onto the driveway. As he did so, he fell 
suffering the neck injury that caused his quadriplegia. The fall 
occurred in the afternoon, during the hours that he normally 
worked. 
REI CHARLES TJ A S 
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petitioner stated in his deposition that he was 
concerned regarding the possibility that the mail carrier might be 
delivering the display. He stated that the display was heavy and 
awkward (measuring 3 feet by 6 inches) and he thought this might 
cause difficulty for the carrier, while negotiating a slippery 
driveway. The petitioner stated that he probably would have salted 
the driveway out of concern for the carrier, even if the display 
was not being delivered by mail. The petitioner had salted his 
driveway over the years, as needed. The display actually was never 
delivered on January 30, 1997, but instead came to the petitioner's 
home on January 3i 1QQ7. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
The petitioner argues that the salting of the driveway was 
a work-related activity, necessary to ensure that the display he 
needed for his business trip, could be delivered to him without 
problem. The petitioner argues that the fact that he may have 
gotten some personal benefit out of salting his driveway should not 
prevent a conclusion that the salting of the driveway had a work 
purpose to it. The petitioner argues that, in choosing to have the 
petitioner work out of his home, the employer has, in essence, 
converted the petitioner's home into the employer's work premises. 
As such, the traditional legal presumption of compensability 
applicable to injuries on the employer's work premises should apply 
to injuries sustained by the petitioner while working at his home. 
The respondent has argued that the salting of the driveway 
was simply a homeowner responsibility that the petitioner chose to 
do on January 30, 1997 and that it was not an activity that was 
engaged in for the benefit of the employer. The respondent argues 
that this is clear from the petitioner' own admission that he would 
have salted the driveway regardless of whether or not the mail 
carrier was bringing the package on January 30, 1997. The 
respondent argues that case law supports the requirement that 
injuries sustained at home are compensable injuries only where they 
are sustained while the employee is engaged in a clearly work-
related activity. As the petitioner's injury-causing activity in 
this case was just a routine homeowner maintenance activity, the 
respondent argues that it does not meet the requirement of being in 
the course of employment. In addition, the respondent argues that 
the risk involved in that activity was not a risk attributable to 
the employer, but rather was a personal risk that the petitioner 
faced, as a result of being a homeowner. 
ORDER 
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DISCUSSION AND AUTHORITY: 
Offices in the home have greatly increased recently, as a 
result of communication advances (computers) that now allow 
information exchanges not possible in the past. With employees 
working out of their homes, the prior workers compensation rules 
and theories are not very helpful in determining what activities 
will be covered and which will be considered deviations from the 
course of employment. Bright line tests offered by the "business 
premises" and meal time breaks do not apply, where someone is 
working in their home. The parties have cited to a few "home 
office" cases, but most of the cases cited in the briefs do not 
involve home offices, but rather deal with various situations 
involving work performed away from the business premises. The ALJ 
is inclined to find the cases dealing specifically with home 
offices to be more on point, in analyzing the compensability issue 
in the instant case. This is because the ALJ finds there is a 
fundamental difference between situations where work is 
occasionally done away from the normal business/work location, and 
cases where the home has been designated as the normal, or only, 
business/work location. 
The two cited cases that clearly involve true home office 
situations are Joe/s Ready Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 65 So. 2d 
268 (Miss. 1953) and Black River Dairy Products. Inc., 207 No. W. 
2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (no Utah cases involving home offices have been 
cited) . In both cases, the home was the primary, or only, place 
where the employee performed work and the courts in both cases 
found coverage existed. In the Ready case, the court went to the 
extreme of accepting that moving a shot gun was in the course of 
employment, because the employee needed to work where the shot gun 
was located. The Black River case actually goes on at length 
discussing the fact that the employer was not just condoning the 
use of the home as a work location, but actually had decided that 
this should be the primary work locale. Therefore, when the 
employee was injured going from his house to his car, the court 
noted that the employee was not going to work, but rather was at 
work and on the employer's premises, since the employer had 
provided no other place of work for the employee, besides his home. 
Many of the cases cited deal with whether travel from home 
to regular business premises is covered, where the home was 
considered an accepted locale to perform some of the work. Kavcee 
Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W. 2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), Wilson v. 
ORDER 
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Service Broadcasters, Inc., S o. 2d 13 3 9 (Miss. 1986). These cases 
found coverage while the employee was in the process of traveling, 
on the basis that travel between several business premises 
locations is generally covered The ALJ finds that these cases are 
not really similar factually to the instant case under review. 
Most, if not all, of the cases where benefits were denied are cases 
where there was no true home office situation. Peetz v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 604 P.2d 2525 (Ariz. 1979) after hours injury with business 
tool, D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps v. Industrial Comm'n, 630 
P.2d 58 (Ariz. 1981) recreational injury with prohibited weapon 
while in 24-hour residency situation, Glasser v. Youth Shop, 54 So. 
2d 686 (Fla. 1951) fall at home carrying work books, where there 
was no requirement that employee take books home, Rowan v. 
University of Nebraska, 299 N. W. 2d 774 (Neb. 1980) art professor 
fixing an at-home studio window, where home studio was an option 
for professor, but was not required by university, Owens v. 
Chrysler Corporation, 371 N. W. 2d 519 (Mich. 1985) employee dies of 
heart attack trying to move a vehicle so he could get ready to go 
on a business trip, Loyd v. Texas Employers Ins. Asso. 280 S.W. 2d 
955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) on-call employee working on a ladder 
outside his home when phone rang and he fell off ladder going to 
answer it. In one Louisiana case where benefits were denied, it is 
simply unclear if a true home office situation was involved. 
Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc.,, 1 58 So, 2d 609 (La. 1963) . 
The above-noted cases appear to show that cour ts are willing 
to take a more expansive view of wha t activities at-home are 
covered, if the employee is required to work at home. The courts 
in Ready Shell and Black River found coverage, even though the 
actual injury-causing activity was not a specific work duty, but 
rather was an act that led up to work being performed. In the 
cases in which employer-required home offices were not involved, 
the courts were more strict in requiring that the injury-causing 
activity was an actual work duty. These results are logical. If 
the employee has chosen to do some work at home, it cannot be said 
that the employer has chosen to accept every risk associated with 
the home as an employment risk. However, when the employer chooses 
to make the employee's home the only location fpr_work, the 
employer can arguably be considered to have accepted the risks 
associated with the home, i.e. the home becomes a business 
premises. This principal has been stated by Professor Larson in 
his treatise. A. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section 
18.34, p. 4-428 (] 997) . 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ finds that the petitioner was injured in the course 
of his employment, while salting the driveway to his home on 
January 30, 1997. The ALJ would agree that, even where the 
employer has chosen to make the employee's home his only work site, 
there is not 24-hour coverage by the employer for any accident that 
occurs within the home. Some connection must exist between the 
injury-causing activity and the employee's work duties. If the 
employee suddenly decides to mow the lawn in the middle of the work 
day, because he notices that the grass is getting long, and he is 
injured doing so, this is not necessarily a work injury, simply 
because the home is the work site. However, in the instant case, 
the ALJ finds that the petitioner was engaged in a work-related 
duty when he was injured salting the driveway, because he was, in 
essence, removing an obstacle which could have impeded his work. 
If the display could not be delivered due to the impassable 
driveway, he would have been without an item he needed to 
accomplish his presentation on the up-coming business trip. 
Therefore, the petitioner went about removing the obstacle to the 
delivery, i.e the ice on the driveway. 
Professor Larson has noted that, just because someone else 
might be the immediate beneficiary of the employee moving an 
obstacle to work, this does not change the fact that the ultimate 
effect of the act is to advance the employer's work. A. Larson, 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section 27.21, p. 5-380 (1997). 
Therefore, it is more or less irrelevant that the petitioner 
benefitted somewhat personally from salting the driveway, because 
the ultimate effect was to remove an obstacle to delivery of the 
display, allowing him to go forward with his work. If the ultimate 
effect is to the benefit of the employer, the general rule is that 
the act is considered in the course of employment. A. Larson, 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation. Section 27.00 (1997). 
The ALJ believes that the petitioner had the delivery of the 
display in mind, when he went about broadcasting the salt. Just 
prior to his fall, he had been loading items in his car, that he 
needed to take on his business trip. It is logical that he would 
have then thought of the one missing item, i.e. the display, and 
the fact that it was to be delivered that day. In combination, the 
sight of the mail carrier in the area, caused the petitioner to go 
get the salt. Although he possibly might have decided to salt the 
drive way at some point anyway, for his own non-job related 
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purposes, this doss not change the fact that, when he did do it, it 
was in an attempt to remove the obstacle that could have prevented 
delivery of the display. It also does not change the fact that the 
ultimate result was that the employer was benefitted by the attempt 
to remove the obstacle. The employer chose to have the 
petitioner's home be his only work site. The employer also chose 
to have the home be the only place where the petitioner received 
his business mail and deliveries, including large awkward packages. 
In this choice, the employer accepted the risk associated with 
maintenance of the petitioner's driveway, which needed to be 
traversed in order to make deliveries. 
Based on the foregoing explanation, the ALJ finds that the 
petitioner is entitled to workers compensation benefits for his 
January 30, 1997 compensable work accident He is statutorily 
permanently totally disabled, per U.C.A. 35-1-67 (nowU.C.A, 34A-2-
413) • As a result, he is entitled to lifetime benefits. 
BENEFITS . „: 
The petitioner1 s compensation rate is figured IK... I o Hows: 
$3 6,500.00 per year divided by 12 = $3,041.67 per month, divided by 
4.33 = $702..46 per week x .667 « $468.54/week, which allows the 
petitioner the maximum permanent total disability rate of $379.00 
per week. The petitioner is entitled to this amount for life. 
Attorney fees are based on the first 312 weeks or $118,248.00, 
figured as required by Commission rule R602-2-4, entitling the 
petitioner's attorney to the maximum rate of $7,500.00, which 
should be deducted from accrued benefits due the petitioner 
(currently approximately 77 weeks, or $29,3 83.00). 
ORDER: 
I T I s THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay the petitioner, Charles Tjas, 
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $379.00, 
beginning the date of his compensable industrial injury, January 
30, 1997 and continuing for the remainder of his life. Accrued 
amounts are due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per 
annum, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the January 30, 1997 industrial accident; said 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay K. Dawn Atkin, attorney for the 
petitioner, the sum of $7,500.00, for services rendered in this 
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the 
petitioner, and to be remitted directly to the office of K. Dawn 
Atkin. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of 
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless 
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to 
review or appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the 
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within 
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for 
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. 
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion, for Review will be decided by the 
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties 
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board 
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days 
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion 
for Review, the request must be made within 20 days of the date of 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1998. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Q3 day of ^^ "1 1998,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, in the 
case of Charles Tias v. AE Clevite. Inc.. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. (Case No. 
97538) to the following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID: 
CHARLES TIAS 
2467 Emmerson 
Salt Lake Cky,UT 84108 
K.DAWNATKIN 
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MICHAEL E. DYER, ATTY 
DORIK. PETERSEN, ATTY 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1609 
Kathy Houskeeper 
H.VJUDGEUOHVBE\tiu.be 
TabC 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
CHARLES TJAS, 
Applicant, 
AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
it 
it 
it 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
k 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 97-0538 
AE Clevite9 Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company (referred to jointly as "Clevite%' hereafter) ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Charles Tjas under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did Mr. Tjas's injury of January 13,1997 arise "out of and in the course of his employment 
by Clevite? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds the following facts to be relevant to the issue raised by Clevite's 
motion for review.1 
In proceedings before the ALJ, the parties agreed that Clevite would submit a written 
statement of its version of the relevant facts. Mr. Tjas would then submit a written response 
modifying Clevite's statement of facts to the extent Mr. Tjas believed necessary. While the 
Commission recognizes the parties hoped to achieve efficiency through this procedure, it is 
unsatisfactory to the Commission because it neither binds the parties to a definite statement 
of stipulated facts, nor provides an evidentiary record sufficient to resolve disputed facts. 
In this case, the parties continue to dispute certain details of Mr. Tjas's claim. It is only 
because the essential facts of the claim are undisputed that the Commission does not remand 
this case for an evidentiary hearing. In future cases, the Commission discourages the use of 
the fact gathering process that was attempted here. 
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Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as district sales manager for 
Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. Clevite did not maintain an office in Salt 
Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal residence as a base of operations for his work. 
To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and 
answering machine for use in his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were 
delivered by U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr. Tjas 
with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday through Thursday 
and performed office work at home on Friday. 
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In winter, the driveway 
is sometimes slick from snow or ice and, consequently, is hazardous to cars and pedestrians. It was 
Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snow from the driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface. 
The night before Mr. Tjas's accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake City. The next 
morning, Monday, January 13,1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local sales calls, but did not first clear 
the snow from his sidewalk and driveway. Instead, Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas 
was making his sales calls. However, the driveway remained icy. 
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading his car with 
material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by Clevite to expect delivery of 
a large package to be used in connection with the trip. Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package 
was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be 
delivered that day or the next Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching, he 
decided to spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and 
make his delivery to the Tjas residence. 
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury for which he 
now seeks workers' compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that "(e)ach 
employee . . . injured... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever such injury occurred,.. . shall be paid compensation . . . and medical... expenses, as 
provided by this chapter." It is undisputed that Mr. Tjas: 1) was employed by Clevite; 2) was injured 
by accident on January 13,1997; 3) was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injury. 
Consequently, it is only necessary for Mr. Tjas to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
injury ''arose out of and in the course of his work for Clevite in order to qualify for the benefits 
provided by the Act. 
In Buczvnski v. Industrial Commission. 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah 
Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of the terms "arising out of employment" and "arising in 
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the course of employment" as follows: 
Under Utah law, an accident occurs uin the course"' of employment when it 
"occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired 
to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he 
was authorized to render such service/' M&K Corp. v. Industrial Common. 112 
Utah 488 493, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948). 
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal relationship' 
between the injury and the employment." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Common. 888 P.2d 707,712 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah 
493,189 P.2d at 134), cert, denied 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). MArising out of,'" 
however, does not mean that the accident must be "'caused by'" the employment; 
rather the employment "4is thought of more as a condition out of which the event 
arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion."' Commercial 
Carriers. 888 P.2d at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise). 
In applying the foregoing standards to Mr. Tjas's claim, the Commission is guided by prior 
appellate decisions which articulate the public policy underlying in Utah's workers' compensation 
system. As the Utah Supreme Court recently noted in Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 
177,182 (Utah 1997): 
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide economic protection for 
employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment, therefore 
"alleviat(ing) hardship upon workers and their families." Baker v. Industrial 
Common. 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965). We have held that u(t)o give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage" and 
that "(a)ny doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the 
injured employee." State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051,1053 
(Utah 1984). 
However, the principle of "liberal construction" for the Act, as stated in Drake and other 
appellate decisions is not without limits. Utah's appellate courts have held that injuries only 
tangentially related to work are not compensable. For example, see Walls v. Industrial 
Commission. 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993) (Judge Jackson dissenting.) Whether an injury arises 
out of and in the course of employment depends upon the specific facts of each case. Inevitably, 
some cases will fall close to the line that divides compensable injuries from noncompensable 
injuries. In the Commission's view, this is such a case. 
To assist in the resolution of this matter, the Commission has carefully reviewed the appellate 
decisions from Utah and other states cited by the parties. For the most part, the cited decisions deal 
with injuries either sustained during employee travel, or during activities undertaken at the specific 
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direction of the employer. A few of the cited cases do involve "work at home" situations, but the 
facts of those cases are substantially different from the facts of Mr. Tjas's claim. Consequemly, no 
specific rule can be extracted from such cases that can properly be applied to Mr. Tjas?s 
circumstances. Therefore, the Commission returns to the fundamental principles of Utah workers' 
compensation law, as described by Utah's appellate courts. 
As noted above, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it "occurs while 
the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something 
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such service/' 
M & K Corp. V- Industrial Common. 112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132. 134 (1948). (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case at hand, Mr. Tjas and his employer had, by joint agreement turned parts of Mr. 
Tjas's home into his workplace. This arrangement may, or may not, have been in Mr. Tjas's best 
interest, but the arrangement obviously freed Clevite from the expense and responsibility of 
maintaining a stand-alone office. Clevite's arrangement with Mr. Tjas did not transform every part 
of his home into a work premise, nor was every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home work-
related. However, Clevite's ability to have work related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas's home by 
mail or courier service was an integral part of the employment relationship between Clevite and Mr. 
Tjas. 
In analyzing the problems presented when an employee is authorized to perform work at 
home, Professor Larson has concluded that "(e)ven when the service performed at home is casual 
or relatively unimportant, an injury occurring in the actual performance of it is in the course of 
employment " Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. §18.34, page 4-427. Based on decisions 
from several jurisdictions, Professor Larson further concludes that " . . . once it is established that 
the home premises are also the work premises,... it follows that the hazards of home premises 
encountered in connection with the performance of the work are also hazards of the employment" 
Larsons Workers' Compensation Law. § 18.34, at page 4-428. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission finds that under the specific facts of this case, Mr. 
Tjas's efforts to make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the 
performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while salting his 
driveway arise "in the course"of his employment for Clevite. 
Having concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in the course of his employment, the 
Commission must next determine whether the injuries also arose "out of his employment, as also 
required by §34A-2-401 of the Act. As previously noted, "arising out of does not mean that the 
accident must be caused by the employment. Rather, the employment is thought of more as a 
condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion. 
Buczvnski at 1172. Certainly, Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "out of his work related efforts to make his 
driveway safe. 
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In summary, the Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose out 
of and in the course of his employment at Clevite. Consequently, Mr. Tjas is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits for those injuries. 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Clevite's motion for review. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this 9k day of February, 1999. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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out of employer's parking lot was struck 
from behind by coempioyee also leaving 
work for the day was not barred from 
maintaining common-law action by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Code 1962, 
§§ 72-1 et seq., 72-401. 
Williams & Parler, Lancaster, for appel-
lant 
Hayes, Hayes & Brunson, Rock Hill, for 
respondent 
MOSS, Acting Chief Justice. 
This is an action brought by Mrs. O. B. 
McNaughton, the appellant herein, to re-
cover damages for personal injuries alleged 
to have been proximately caused by the 
negligence of James F. Sims, the respond-
ent herein. It is alleged that the appellant's 
injuries were sustained as the result of an 
automobile collision between the automobile 
she was operating and one operated by the 
respondent. 
The respondent, by answer, entered (1) a 
general denial; (2) sole negligence; (3) 
contributory negligence; and (4) that both 
parties, at the time and place of the colli-
sion, were employees of Springs Cotton 
Mills and the injury of the appellant arose 
out of and in the course of such employ-
ment, and by virtue of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, Section 72-401 of the 
Code, he was exempt from common law 
liability to the appellant The appellant re-
plied to this special defense and raised the 
question that under the aforesaid Code 
section there was no immunity provided. 
The matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable C. Bruce Little John, and a jury, 
at the 1965 January term of the Court of 
Common Pleas for Lancaster County. At 
the close of the testimony in behalf of the 
appellant, the respondent made a motion 
for a nonsuit upon the ground that she 
could not maintain a common law action 
and that her exclusive remedy for her per-
sonal injuries was afforded by the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The motion of 
the respondent was granted by the trial 
judge and this appeal followed. 
It appears from the record that Springs 
Cotton Mills owned and maintained a 
fenced parking area immediately adjacent 
to its plant where only employees and busi-
ness visitors were permitted to park their 
automobiles. The appellant and respondent 
were both employees of Springs Cotton 
Mills and had, on August 8, 1963, parked 
their respective automobiles in the afore-
said parking area. The parties to this ac-
tion finished their duties as employees of 
Springs Cotton Mills at 4:00 P.M. on Au-
gust 8, 1963. They left the plant of their 
employer and proceeded to the parking lot. 
The appellant was proceeding out of said 
parking lot in her automoble when she was 
struck from behind by the automobile driven 
by the respondent. At the time of the ac-
cident both parties had completed their 
work for Springs Cotton Mills and were on 
their way home. There is no suggestion 
that the parties to this action, at the time 
of the collision, were performinng any work 
incident to their employer's business. 
Hence, there are no facts upon which any 
common law liability of Springs Cotton 
Mills to the appellant could be predicated 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
or otherwise. 
The recent decision of this Court in the 
case of Williams v. Bebbington, S.C., 146 
S.E2d 853, (filed February 15, 1966) is 
here controlling and requires a reversal of 
the order of nonsuit granted by the lower 
court in this case. It is unnecessary for us 
to restate what we said in the cited case. 
Reversed and remanded ior a new trial. 
LEWIS, BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD, 
JJ., and LEGGE, Acting Associate Justice, 
concur. 
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Allen Bennle BRYAN, Employee-Plaintiff, 
v. 
FIRST FREE WILL BAPTIST CHURCH, 
Employer, Insurance Company of North 
America, Carrier, Defendants. 
No. 361. 
Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
April 20, 1966. 
Workmen's compensation case. The 
Superior Court, Lenoir County, Edward B. 
Clark, Special Judge, entered judgment for 
claimant and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Parker, C. J., held that back 
injury sustained by claimant when he was 
moving his stove from his employer's par-
sonage did not arise out of his employment 
as minister, although moving of the stove 
from the parsonage was for his employer's 
benefit. 
Reversed. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <3=3|358, 1361 
M 
To obtain award of compensation for 
injury under North Carolina Workmen's 
Compensation Act, employee must show that 
he sustained personal injury by accident, 
that his injury arose in course of his em-
ployment and out of his employment. G.S. 
§ 97-1 et seq. 
2. Workmen's Compensation ^=>3, 604 
Requirement of Workmen's Compen-
sation Act that injury to be compensable 
must be shown to have resulted from acci-
dent arising out of and in course of em-
ployment is known and referred to as "rule 
of causal relation" and that rule prevents 
Workmen's Compensation Act from being 
a general health and insurance benefit act 
G.S. § 97-1 et seq. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workmen's Compensation <$=609 
Where injury cannot fairly be traced 
to employment as contributing proximate 
cause, it does not arise out of employ-
ment. G.S. § 97-1 et seq. 
4. Workmen's Compensation <S=I705 
Whether accident arose out of employ-
ment is mixed question of law and fact. 
G.S. § 97-1 ct seq. 
5. Workmen's Compensation C=»66l 
Back injury sustained by claimant when 
he was moving his stove from parsonage 
owned by his employer did not arise out 
of his employment as minister, although 
moving of the stove from the parsonage was 
for benefit of employer. G.S. §§ 97-2(6, 9), 
97-29, 97-31(23). 
Claim for compensation under Work-
men's Compensation Act. 
Forrest II. Shu ford, II, the hearing com-
missioner, based upon stipulations entered 
into by the parties at the hearing, found 
the jurisdictional facts; that Insurance 
Company of North America was the com-
pensation insurance carrier on the risk at 
the date of the alleged injury by accident on 
17 August 1964; and that plaintiffs aver-
age weekly wage was $85. The essential 
findings of fact of the hearing commission-
er are as follows: 
"I. On and prior to 17 August 1964 
plaintiff was regularly employed by the 
defendant employer as its minister. In 
addition to receiving a salary plaintiff 
was furnished with a home in which to 
live which was called the parsonage. The 
parsonage was owned by defendant em-
ployer and was used for many church 
functions including marriage, counselling, 
and other activities. 
"2. Sometime prior to 17 August 1964 
it was determined that plaintiff's employ-
ment with defendant employer would be 
terminated as of 1 September 1964. As 
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of such date plaintiff was to assume the 
duties as minister of the Core Creek Free 
Will Baptist Church and was also to be-
come associated with the State Conven-
tion of the Church. 
"3. The parsonage where plaintiff 
lived was in need of repairs including 
the replacement of some flooring. At 
the request of the Governing Board of 
defendant employer, plaintiff agreed to 
move out of the parsonage approximately 
two weeks prior to the termination of 
his employment with defendant employ-
er. This was to be done in order that re-
pairs could be made to the parsonage be-
fore the new minister of defendant em-
ployer moved into the parsonage. 
"4. In accordance with the above stat-
ed arrangement plaintiff undertook to 
move his household and kitchen furniture 
out of the parsonage on 17 August 1964. 
The moving of the furniture at such time 
was for the benefit of defendant employ-
er in order that its parsonage could be 
vacant so that repairs could be made. 
"5. On 17 August 1964 some mem-
bers of the Core Creek Church, into whose 
church parsonage plaintiff was to move, 
assisted plaintiff in moving his furniture 
from the defendant employer's parson-
age. Plaintiff and one of the members 
of such church attempted to move plain-
tiff's two-hundred-pound electric stove 
from the parsonage. Plaintiff walked 
backward while holding one end of the 
stove with the other end being carried by 
another. The stove was carried through 
a passageway in the parsonage. Because 
of the narrowness of the passageway, 
plaintiff had to put one hand on the bot-
tom and one hand on the top of the stove. 
While so going through the narrow pas-
sageway, a door on the stove came open, 
and while still holding one end of the two-
hundred-pound stove and trying to close 
the door, plaintiff had a pain in his back. 
"6. The lifting of the stove was not 
a part of the plaintiffs usual and custom-
ary work and was out of the ordinary 
for him. Plaintiff sustained, as describ-
ed above, an injury by accident. 
"7. The moving of the stove from the 
defendant employer's parsonage at the 
time that it was being done was pri-
marily for the benefit of defendant em-
ployer; it was done while plaintiff was 
still minister of the defendant employer 
and on the payroll of his employer; and 
it occurred upon defendant's premises. 
Plaintiffs injury by accident arose out 
of and in the course of his employment 
with defendant employer. 
"8. Following his accident plaintiff 
continued to have back pain which became 
more severe on 27 September 1964. 
Plaintiff thereupon consulted with Dr. 
John T. Langley, orthopedic surgeon of 
Kinston. Dr. Langley treated plaintiff 
conservatively at home for a period of 
time but in that plaintiff did not recover 
he was hospitalized on 1 November 1964 
and a myelogram was done. The find-
ings of such myelogram were positive 
and Dr. Langley operated upon plaintiff 
for removal of a ruptured disc on 4 No-
vember 1964. 
"9. Plaintiff sustained no loss of wag-
es or salary as a result of his injury by 
accident and thus sustained no temporary 
total disability. Plaintiff does have a five 
per cent permanent partial disability of 
the back as a result of the injury by ac-
cident." 
The hearing commissioner's conclusions 
of law are as follows: 
" 1 . On 17 August 1964 plaintiff sus-
tained an injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of his employment 
with defendant employer. G.S. 97-2(6). 
"2. As a result of the injury by acci-
dent giving rise hereto plaintiff sustained 
no temporary total disability. G.S. 97-2 
(9); G.S. 97-29. 
"3. As a result of the injury by acci-
dent giving rise hereto plaintiff sustained 
a five per cent permanent partial dis-
ability of the back, for which he is en-
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titled to compensation at the rate of 
$37.50 per week, for a period of fifteen 
weeks, commencing 28 December 1964. 
G.S. 97-31(23)." 
Based upon his findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, the hearing commissioner 
awarded plaintiff compensation, to be paid 
to him in a lump sum, subject to a fee al-
lowed to his counsel to be deducted from 
compensation awarded plaintiff. 
Defendants appealed to the Full Commis-
sion, which adopted as its own the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of Commis-
sioner Shuford, together with the result 
reached by him, and affirmed the award. 
Whereupon, defendants appealed to the 
superior court which entered a judgment 
overruling each and every exception and 
assignment of error by defendants, and af-
firmed the award of the Full Commission. 
From this judgment defendants appeal to 
the Supreme Court. 
Wallace, Langley & Barwick, by P. C. 
Barwick, Jr., Kinston, for defendant appel-
lants. 
Aycock, LaRoque, Allen, Cheek & Hines, 
by F. Fred Cheek, Jr., and John M. Hines, 
Kinston, for plaintiff appellee. 
PARKER, Chief Justice. 
Defendants assign as errors the trial 
judge's overruling their exception to the 
hearing commissioner's finding of fact No. 
6, which was affirmed by the Full Com-
mission; the trial judge's overruling their 
exception to the hearing commissioner's 
finding of fact No. 7, which was affirmed 
by the Full Commission; and the trial 
judge's overruling their exception to the 
hearing commissioner's conclusion of law 
No. 1, which was affirmed by the Full Com-
mission, which challenged findings of fact 
and challenged conclusion of law arc set 
forth verbatim above. 
[1,2] To obtain an award of compensa-
tion for an injury under the North Carolina 
Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee 
must show that he sustained a personal 
injury by accident, that his injury arose 
in the course of his employment, and that 
his injury arose out of his employment. 
Lewis v. W. B. Lea Tobacco Co., 260 
N.C 410, 132 S.E.2d 877; Anderson v. 
Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 
64 S.E.2d 265; Withers v. Black, 230 
N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d 668. The require-
ment of the Act that an injury to be 
compensable must be shown to have resulted 
from an accident arising out of and in 
the course of the employment is known 
and referred to as the rule of causal rela-
tion; i. e. that an injury to be compensable 
must arise from his employment. The 
rule of causal relation is "the very sheet 
anchor of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act," and has been adhered to in our 
decisions, and prevents our Act from being 
a general health and insurance benefit 
act. Duncan v. City of Charlotte. 234 
N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22; Perry v. American 
Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d o43. 
This is said in Bell v. Dewey Brothers, 
Inc., 236 N.C. 280, 72 S.H.2d 680: 
" * * * The words 'in the course 
of, as used in the statute, refer to 
the time, place and circumstances tinder 
which the accident occurred, while 'out 
oV relates to its origin or cause. 
" 'Arising out of means arising out 
of the work the employee is to do, or 
out of the service he is to perform. 
The risk must be incidental to the em-
ployment. [Citing authority ] 
"In order to entitle the claimant to 
compensation the evidence must show 
that the injury by accident arose out of 
and in the course of his employment by 
the defendant. Both arc necessary to 
justify an award of compensation under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. [Cit-
ing authority.]" 
This is said in Ilildchrand v. McDowell 
Furniture Co., 212 N.C. 100, 193 S.E. 29*: 
"So it has been stated as a general 
proposition that the phrase 'out of and 
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in the course of the employment* embrac-
only those accidents which happen to 
servant while he is engaged in the dis 
charge of some function or duty which 
he is authorized to undertake and which 
is calculated to further, directly or in-
directly, the master's business." 
[3] It is settled law that "[w]here an 
njury cannot fairly be traced to the em-
3loyment as a contributing proximate cause 
" * * it does not arise out of the em-
-•ioyment," Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co.. 
222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E2d 751; Lockey v. 
3ohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356f 
96 S.E. 342; Walker v. J, D. Wilkin-
nc , 212 N.C. 627, 194 S E. 89. 
[4] Whether an accident arose out -*£ 
the employment is a mixed question o; 
law and fact Sandy v. Stackh'-*-=*' ~^-
258 N.C 194, 128 SJE-2d 21R 
The case of Van Devander v. Wes^ 
Side M. E. Church, 160 A. 763, 10 N.J. 
Misc. 793, is apposite. This was a pro-
ceeding under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law by Don J. Van Devander, opposed 
by the West Side M. E. Church. To re-
view a judgment of the Compensation Bu-
reau awarding compensation, the employer 
brought certiorari for determination of a 
judgment of the Compensation Bureau 
awarding compensation to Van Devander 
for injuries alleged to have been sustained 
by him as the result of an accident aris-
ing out of and in the course of his em-
ployment by the West Side M. E. Church, 
the employer. The facts as stated in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey arc as follows: Van Devander is 
a Methodist minister and was assigned 
by the bishop to and employed as pastor 
by West Side M. E. Church. His salary 
was $3,450 per annum and he was housed 
in the church parsonage (and was ap-
parently required to live there), for which 
the sum of $700 was deducted from his 
salary. He was furnished no janitor ser-
vice for the parsonage, and was required 
to do all house work, ground keeping, 
and care of the furnace himself. On 
I t November 1930 while removing a barrel 
of ashes from the cellar of the parsonage, 
he strained his back. The only testimony, 
outside of medical evidence, was that of 
the petitioner. He testified that he was 
required to keep the parsonage in condition 
for use by the members of the congregation, 
and that it was used for weddings, christen-
ings, and other parish meetings. The Cour* 
said in its opinion: 
"We are inclined to think that *^  
was error to hold that the accident arose 
out of the employment. Petitioner was 
performing a household duty for his 
own benefit which he would have been 
required to perform if he lived in a 
house owned by himself. In Bryant v. 
Fissell, 84 N.J.Law, 72, 86 A. 458, 460, 
the act was said to cover risks 'which 
are within the ordinary scope of the 
particular employment in which the work-
man is engaged.' Now the employment 
here was that of a minister. Carrying 
ashes is certainly not incidental to that 
office, directly or indirectly. Petitioner 
takes the position that the church im-
posed certain additional duties, namely, 
care of the parsonage. But it does 
not seem that this is so. Care of a 
dwelling house ordinarily falls upon the 
occupant and does not have to be so 
imposed.' What the c h u ^ did was 
to refuse to furnish service -w-»ch would 
relieve him of this burden. 
* * * * * * 
* * In the instant case we think 
th the time of the accident the re-
sp - i t was performing an act personal 
to i»TiseIf and his family, and not con-
nected with his employment as a minister. 
The award is set aside, with costs.'* 
See also Lauterbach v. Jarelt, 189 App. 
Div. 303, 178 N.Y S. 480, 481, which the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey cites in 
its opinion as a case that seems to be in 
point 
l a the instant case claimant's employ-
—^it by First Free Will Baptist Church 
a^ that of minister. He was not employed 
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to move his furniture out of his employer's 
parsonage, when he terminated his em-
ployment as minister with First Free Will 
Baptist Church. Claimant testified in part -
The agreement with the church is when 
am dismissed as a minister that my 
esponsibility is to move out of the parson-
ge. * * * The parsonage needed som<» 
epairs to the floor and around the ar**a 
rom where the automatic washer sat. Thp 
»oard had gotten together and we had gotten 
together and agreed that I should mov? 
iut of the parsonage about two weeks 
Trior to that time, in order for repair^ 
*o be done at the parsonage * * 
was not paid anything to move my fur 
niture from the parsonage. I did not pav 
anyone to move the furniture but the church 
that I was moving to volunteered to help 
me transfer the furniture.'* He stated in 
part on redirect examination: "Some of 
*he furniture in the parsonage belonged to 
*he church—some scattered pieces of fur 
"iture. * * * Most of the furniture that 
the church itself owned was located in 
•he living room. It was necessary to move 
"ome of this furniture out of the way 
o that we cou.'" ^iove through with the 
ther furniture * 
[5] In our opinion, and we. so hold, tb«= 
findings of fact by the hearing commi< 
sioner, affirmed by the Full Commission 
clearly show that claimant's injury did no* 
arise out of and in the course of his em 
ployment by First Free Will Baptist Church 
as its minister, or in other words the find 
ings of fact plainly show that claimant's 
injury cannot fairly be traced to his em-
ployment as a minister as a contributing 
proximate cause. The findings of fact 
by the hearing commissioner, affirmed by 
the Full Commission, plainly show that 
although the moving of the stove from the 
parsonage was for his employer's benefit, 
and although he was still minister and on 
the payroll of his employer, his injury arose 
out of his performing an act personal to 
himself and his family in moving the stove 
to his new church, probably its parsonage, 
and it was not connected with his employ-
ment as minister by First Free Will Bap 
tist Church. 
The trial court erred in overruling de-
fendants' exception to the finding of fact 
by the hearing commissioner, affirmed bv 
the Full Commission, that "plaintiff's in-
jury * * * arose out of and in the 
course of his employment with defendant 
employer," and in overruling defendants* 
exception to the hearing commissioner's 
conclusion of law, affirmed by the Full 
Commission, that "on 17 August 1Q64 plain-
tiff sustained an injury * * * arising 
out of and in the course of his ernplov 
ment with defendant employer" 
Therefore, it ;s unnecessan for u«* to 
pass on defendants' assignment of error 
to the trial court's overruling their *1%*-
ception to the conclusion of law by the 
hearing commissioner, affirmed by the Full 
Commission, that plaintiff sustained an \v 
jury by accident. As to injury by accident, 
see Pardue v. Blackburn Bros Oil & Tire 
Co, 260 NC. U3, 132 S F 2d 747 
For the reasons stated above, the judg-
ment of the court below is reversed, and 
the superior court will remand this cau«e 
to the Industrial Commission for an order 
m compliance with this opinion. 
Reversed. 
MOORE, J., not sitting. 
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Review Denied April 6, 1981. 
PRIOR 
Review MCCI from the Industrial Commission of 
the State of Colorado. 
DISPOSITION: Order Set Aside and Cause Remanded 
with Directions. 
CORE TERMS: claimant, painting, undisputed, cus-
tomers, rear, workmen's, duties 
COUNSEL: George J. Francis, Denver, Colorado, 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
J D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, 
Sommerville, Assistant Attorney General. D< 
Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents, Industry 
Commission of the State of Colorado, John Kezer, 
Director, Mike Baca, Richard J. Wise, Harvey L. 
Rubinstein, as Members of said Industrial Commission. 
Hall and Evans, Frederic A. Ritsema, Robert W. 
Harris, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents, 
General Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company 
and James J. Brogger and Associates, Incorporated. 
JUDGES; Judge Coyte. Judge Pierce and Judge Ruland, 
concur 
OPINIONBY: COYTE 
OPINION: [*70i] Claimant seeks review of the 
Industrial Commission's denial of her claim for work-
men's compensation. We set aside the order. 
The following facts are undisputed. 
Claimant and her husband were the principal fl-
eers of a corporation, James J. Brogger and Assoc;.-.:.:-
(Employer), which does engineering work. They main-
tained the [**2] company office in their home. Payment 
on the mortgage of the house was made in part by the 
laimant and her husband, personally, and in part by 
the employer-corporation. Mr. Brogger and claimant 
had owned other properties in which they had lived and 
maintained an office. As the office of the company had 
moved to various locations, claimant's duties included 
painting, varnishing, cleaning, and maintenance work, 
in addition to secretarial duties, and "anything pertaining 
to running a consulting engineering firm." In the spring 
of 1977, claimant and her husband decided that their 
home/office needed to be repainted to appear more at-
tractive to customers who were occasionally entertained 
on the [*702] patio attached to the rear of the house. 
While painting on the rear of the house, claimant fell 
from a ladder and was injured. 
The Commission found that: "The painting of the sec-
ond story at the rear of the home is primarily related to 
the need for maintenance of the home and only inciden-
tallv if " ne business conducted from the home." 
s*m concluded that claimant's injury did 
ot arise out or and in the course of her employment, 
rfased as it is upon undisputed [**3] facts we can, and 
do, reject this conclusion as not binding upon us. See 
Ceteris v. Times Publishing Co., 38 Colo. App. 48, 
::2 P. 2d 1033 (1976). 
An employee is entiticu iu WUIMI: 
benefits where, inter alia, at the time ^ ^ nV«. 
employee is performing service arising out of an 
the course of his employment. Section 8-52-102(1 
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Cum. Supp.). 
In determining whether an injury has arisen out of 
and in the course of employment, the central, inquiry is 
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whether it is apparent: 
"from the circumstances attendant upon claimant's in-
jury that the cause was employment-related and that the 
time, place, and circumstances of the injury were not so 
remote from the purposes of his employment that the act 
in which he was engaged when injury occurred must be 
considered one for the benefit of claimant only." Deterts, 
supra. 
Thus, the test is not whether the benefits to the em-
ployer are incidental or primary, but whether the acts of 
the employee at the time of the injury were solely for his 
own benefit. If the acts were for his sole benefit then 
his injury does not arise out of his employment. 
Here, in light of the undisputed [**4] evidence that 
the company office was in claimant's home, and that the 
home was used to entertain customers, the finding of the 
Commission that there was no benefit to the employer 
from the work being performed by claimant at the time 
of her injury is not supported by the evidence and must 
be rejected. See Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 32 
Colo. App. 270, 511 R2d 921 (1973). Consequently, 
the injury did arise out of claimant's employment and is 
compensable. 
The commission also erred in concluding that the in-
jury was not in the course of the employer's business. 
It is true that § 8-41-106(l)(b), C.R.S. 1973, excludes 
from the definition of "employee" any person "whose 
employment is but casual and not in the usual course 
of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the 
employer." However, both conditions, casualness and 
course of business, must exist for the exclusion to ap-
ply. Heckman v. Warren, 124 Colo. 497, 238 P.2d 
854 (1951). And, for the employee's work to be in the 
usual course of the employer's business, it must merely 
be "of the kind required in the employer's business and 
in conformity with his established scheme or system of 
doing business, . . . [**5] ." Heckman, supra. 
Here, the maintenance of the home which served as 
the company office and was used for entertaining cus-
tomers was a necessary facet of the employer's busi-
ness, and thus, the statutory exclusion was not applica-
ble to claimant. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 105 Colo. 25, 94R2d697 (1939). Hence, 
the conclusion of the Commission that the painting in 
which claimant was engaged when injured was not in 
the course of her employer's business is not supported 
by the record. 
Consequently, we reject both conclusions upon which 
the Commission based its denial of benefits, see Deterts 
v. Times Publishing Co., supra, and instead, conclude 
that claimant qualified for disability benefits. 
The order of the Industrial Commission is set aside 
and the cause is remanded for such hearing as may be 
necessary and the issuance of a new order awarding ap-
propriate benefits. 
JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE RULAND, concur. 
Tab 3 
Page 6 
158 So. 2d 609 printed in FULL format. 
Victor C. DANIELSEN v. SECURITY VAN LINTc INC., and Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York 
• 0 
Supreme Cour n: Louisiana 
245 La. 450; 158 So. 2d 609; 1963 La. LEXIS 2679 
December 16, 1963 
CORE TERMS: Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, garbage, apartment, customers, evening, 
workmen, garage, total disability, expense account, permanent, estimates, descend, flight, route, outer, 
duty 
COUNSEL: [***!] 
Steven. R Plotkin, New Orleans, for applicant.. 
W. K. Christovich, Christovich & Kearney, New 
Orleans, for appellees and respondents. 
JUDGES: Sanders, Justice. 
OPINIONBV SANDFRS 
OPINION, r^zj r~fc-
Danielsen, sued his empK-. 
and its insurer for workmen's compensation. 1*453] The 
defendants resisted t1 ground that the 
accident did not arise course of plain-
tiffs employment. The district court denied recovery. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, nl We granted a writ 
of certiorari, 244 La. 223, 151 So.2d [**610] 693, to 
review the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
nl -
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeal, are sub-
stantially these: The plaintiff, Danielsen, was employed 
by Security Van Lines, Inc., as a salesman-estimator on 
a commission basis. His duties required him to go to 
the premises of prospective customers and prepare es-
timates of the charges for moving or storing household 
effects. In addition, [***2] he solicited business for 
his employer. He had no fixed working hours and ar-
ranged his own work schedule. He worked each week 
day. including a half-day on Saturday, at hours conve-
nient to him and the customers. He made some calls on 
prospective customers during the evening. He likewise 
received some telephone calls from or through Security 
at his home after 5:00 o'clock p. m. However, he was 
not required to service these calls during the evening, 
unless he chose to do so. Danielsen performed some 
"paper work" at home, particularly at the end of the 
month in connection with his expense account. He also 
usually reviewed the calls he was to make [*454] be-
fore leaving his home each day so as to arrange them in 
proper order. 
Security furnished Danielsen an automobile for use in 
connection with his work. It also paid the automobile 
expenses, including the gas, oil, and insurance. The au-
tomobile was kept in a garage one-half block from plain-
tiffs residence, the rent of which was paid by Security. 
Danielsen lived in an apartment on the second floor of 
a two story triplex, In order for him, to leave the apart-
ment, it was necessary that he pass through his kitchen, 
descend a [***3] flight of steps, open an, outer door, and 
descend two additional steps to ground level. 
On the day preceding the accident which forms the 
basis of this suit, the plaintiff picked up several mem-
oranda at Security's main office, which listed estimates 
for the following day, Saturday. During the evening, he 
worked on his expense account, for it was the end of the 
month. He also checked the memoranda to determine 
his route. 
On Saturday morning, he rechecked his route, placed 
the memoranda in his pocket, and descended the flight 
of steps leading from his apartment. He carried a small 
sheaf of rate schedules. He also carried a bag of garbage, 
which he intended to place in a garbage can on his way 
to the [*455] garage. He fell from one of the two outer 
steps and sustained a broken hip, which he alleges has 
produced permanent and total, disability. 
Based upon these facts, the plaintiff contends that the 
accident arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment within the intendment of the Louisiana Workmen's 
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Compensation Act. Hence, he asserts, workmen's com-
pensation is payable to him for permanent total disability. 
The defendants assert that the accident did not arise out 
of [~*~4] or in the course of the employment. Hence, 
they urge that the injury is not compensable under the 
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The primary issue presented here is whether the acci-
dent occurred in the course of plaintiff s employment. 
LSA-R.S. 23:1031, the pertinent section of the 
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, provides: 
"If an employee not otherwise eliminated from the bene-
fits of this Chapter, receives personal injury by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, his 
employer shall pay [*456] compensation in the amounts, 
on the conditions, and to the person or persons here-
inafter designated." 
Coverage is provided under the Louisiana Workmen's 
Compensation Act only if the accident occurred in the 
course of the employment. By course of employment 
[**611] is meant the time and space boundaries of the 
employment. n2 
n2 Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So. 
19; Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation 
Law and Practice, § 162, pp. 173-175 (1951); 
Mayer, Workmen's Compensation Law in Louisiana, 
pp.'55-58 (1937). 
When the employment begins or ends cannot be deter-
mined by reference to an exact formula. Each case must 
be resolved by a consideration of the particular facts 
and circumstances. It is, of course, well settled that the 
statute must be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate 
its beneficent purpose of relieving the workmen of the 
crushing economic burden of work-connected injuries 
by diffusing the cost in the channels of commerce. n3 
n3 See Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 
199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 and Dyer v. Rapides 
Lumber Co., 154 La. 1091, 98 So. 677. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeal found that 
the plaintiff's employment was not continuous. It found 
that he was neither on duty nor on call for twenty-four 
hours each day. Plaintiff conceded the correctness of 
the finding during oral argument in this Court. In our 
opinion, the evidence supports it. 
[*457] This finding, however, does not fully resolve 
the question of whether the accident occurred within the 
course of plaintiff's employment. [***6] It simply fore-
closes the contention that plaintiff was in the course of 
his employment at all times. We still must determine 
whether or not the plaintiff had entered the course of his 
employment prior to the accident. This inquiry brings 
into focus the time and place relationship between the 
accident and the employment. 
We observe that the plaintiff fell on the steps of his res-
idence. At the time, he was carrying a sack of garbage, 
which he intended to deposit in the garbage can. He 
had not reached the garage, where the company auto-
mobile was kept. The time of the accident did not fall 
within fixed work [*458] hours, for the plaintiff had 
none. Neither can we reasonably say that the accident 
occurred while he was engaged in the performance of 
his duties. In our opinion, the circumstances demon-
strate that he had not as yet crossed the boundary of his 
employment. 
We conclude that the disabling accident did not occur 
in the course of plaintiff's employment. Hence, plaintiff 
cannot recover. 
We have noted the cases from other jurisdictions cited 
by plaintiff. Each of these rests upon its own facts. We 
have elected to base our decision on the statutory lan-
guage and the [***7] general principles enunciated in 
the jurisprudence interpretative of it. 
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal is affirmed. 
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and insufficient; he has often lost his tem-
per for no rational reason, even to the point 
of thinking about running his truck off the 
road or into cars on the road that delay 
him; he often has intense headaches that 
require him to walk the floor for hours if at 
night and to pull his logging truck off to 
the side of the road if by day; he occasion-
ally has hallucinations, thinking that he 
hears non-existent things such as a baby 
crying in the night; and he no longer likes 
to associate with others, including his own 
wife and child. Though this evidence, 
along with the psychologist's expert opin-
ion about it, is""the basis for plaintiffs claim 
that he has a compensable brain injury the 
Commission made no findings about the 
truth or falsity of any of i t Thus, the case 
presented to the Commission has not been 
decided, and it will not be properly decided, 
in my view, until findings from the compe-
tent evidence are made as to whether plain-
tiffs emotional and mental health, person-
ality and conduct have in fact changed 
since the log hit him on the head and, if so, 
what probably caused the change. 
My vote is to vacate the decisio 
remand to the Commission for a J 
nation of the brain injury issue arer n-n 
sidering all the competent evidence 
presented "in its true legal Ught" Han-
ford v. McSwain, 230 N.C. 229, 233, 53 
S.E.2d 84, 87 (1949). 
Betty B, FORTNIR Employee Plaintiff. 
• . 
J.K. HOLDING COMPANY, Employer, 
American Insurance Company, 
Carrier Defendants. 
No. 8610IC216. 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina. 
Oct 21, 1986. 
Claimant, injured while hanging plants, 
which she had been asked to dispose of, at 
her home, during working hours, sought 
workers' compensation benefits. The In-
dustrial Commission denied claim for bene-
fits, affirming opinion of deputy commis-
sioner, and claimant appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Martin, J., held that claimant's 
accident neither arose out of her employ-
ment nor occurred in course thereof and, 
thus, claimant was not eligible for workers' 
compensation benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Phillips, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Workers' Compensation «=»610 
Injury arises out of employment when 
It is natural and probable consequence or 
incident of employment and natural r« " 
of one of risks thereof, so that ther is 
some causal relationship between in y 
and performance of some service of n-
ployment G.S. § 97-2(6). 
Workers' Compensation «=»710 
Claimant's injury, sustained while 
anging plants from closed office at her 
home, during working hours, did not arise 
out of her employment and did not occur in 
course thereof and, thus, she was ineligible 
for workers' compensation benefits, though 
she had been instructed by employer to 
dispose of plants; decision to take plants to 
her home was motivated by purely personal 
considerations, and not for benefit of her 
employer to any appreciable extent, and 
cause of injury was not enhanced by em-
ployment G.S. § 97-2(6). 
On and before 31 August 1984, plaintiff 
was employed by J.K. Holding Company, a 
corporation owned by J.C. Kivett, as the 
sole employee of its Statesville, N.C. office. 
Her primary duties consisted of book-
keeping and secretarial work but, as the 
sole employee, she performed other tasks 
as well, including running personal errands 
for Mr. Kivett, cleaning the office, dispos-
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ing of trash, and tending to various decora-
tive plants which she and Mr. Kivett kept 
in the office. Her normal working hours 
were from 9:00 to 5:00. She was paid $250 
per week and was provided a tank-full of 
gas each month as reimbursement for the 
business use of her personal automobile. 
Mr. Kivett decided to close the Statesville 
office, effective 31 August 1984, and made 
arrangements to lease the space to a new 
tenant beginning 1 September. Since this 
decision resulted in the termination of 
plaintiffs job, Mr. Kivett agreed to pay 
plaintiff her regular salary through the end 
of 1984 as severance pay. Because he 
would not be in the office on 31 August 
1984, Mr. Kivett instructed plaintiff to pack 
the office materials and clean and close the 
office. Mr. Kivett also asked plaintiff to 
dispose of the plants, except for one which 
he wanted to keep. He did not tell plaintiff 
what to do with the plants, but was aware 
that she was likely to take them to her own 
home. This was, in fact, what plaintiff did 
plan to do. 
Before leaving her home to go to work 
on the morning of 31 August 1984, the 
plaintiff stood on a chair and drove a large 
nail into her porch. She intended to hang a 
device, called a single tn**- on the rm,' 
from which she WOUM • M•$,. *-«- i * 
from the office. At 'v,^-<* ^Mi ' v .»v 
noon, plaintiff put tU 
and drove to her hm 
the plants quickly am 
office to complete K. . *• r- •• 
that time because her :JH*J?,»-T»— ^ ,, '« *. ,• 
home and available < • •$ •.••*:•: ,. 
plants. Plaintiff testified that had sh* 
waited until after work to take her plants 
home, her daughter would have gone to 
work and, since plaintiffs husband was out 
of town, no one would have been available 
to assist her in hanging the plants. 
Upon arriving at her home, plaintiff 
stood on a chair and hung the single tree 
on the nail. She stepped down from the 
chair and noticed that the single tree was 
crooked. She climbed back onto the chair 
in order to straighten the device and fell to 
the cement floor, injuring her hip. After 
being admitted to the hospital, she made 
telephone arrangements for others to do 
the tasks which she had not completed at 
her employer's office. 
Plaintiff applied for workers' compensa^ 
tion benefits. Deputy Commissioner Rush 
found facts essentially as stated above and 
concluded the plaintiffs accidental injur}' 
"did not arise out of and in the course of 
her employment" Her claim for benefits 
was denied. The Full Commission, with 
Commissioner Clay dissenting, affirmed 
the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commis-
sioner Rush. Plaintiff appeals. 
Homesley, Jones, Gaines & Fields by Ed-
mund L. Gaines, Statesville, for plaintiff-
appellant 
Hedrick Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe 
by Thomas E. Williams, Charlotte, for de-
fendant-appellee. 
MARTIN, Judge. 
There is no dispute with respect to the 
facts found by the Commission. The only 
question involved in this appeal is whether 
the Commission properly found and con-
cluded that plaintiff is ineligible for work-
er's compensation benefits because her ac 
cidental injury did not arise out of and in 
the course of her employment We affirm 
In order for an injured employee to be 
eligible for workers' compensation benefits 
for accidental injury, the claimant must 
prove that the injury arose out of the em-
ployment and that it occurred in the course 
of the employment. G.S. 97-2(6); Hoyle v. 
Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 
251, 293 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1982). Both ele-
ments—i.e., "arising out o f employment 
and "in the course o f employment— must 
be satisfied or compensation will be denied 
the injured employee. Hoyle, supra. Al-
though interrelated, each of these elements 
has a distinct meaning: *'[t]he term 'arising 
out of refers to the origin or cause of the 
accident, and the term 'in the course of 
refers to the time, place and circumstances 
of the accident" Id. 
[1J An injury arises out of the employ 
ment when it is a natural and pr< 
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consequence or incident of the employment 
and a natural result of one of the risks 
thereof, so that there is some causal rela-
tion between the injury and the perform-
ance of some service of the employment 
Id. at 252, 293 S.E.2d at 198, quoting Per-
ry v. Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 273-74, 
136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964). It has been 
held that the test of whether an accidental 
injury "arises out o f the employment is 
whether a contributing proximate cause of 
the injury was a risk inherent or incidental 
to the employment and one to which the 
employee would not have been equally ex-
posed apart from the employment Galli-
more v. Marilyns Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 
S.E.2d 529 (1977). 
An injury occurs "in the course of" the 
employment "when the injury occurs dur-
ing the period of employment at a place 
where an employee's duties are calculated 
to take him, and under circumstances in 
which the employee is engaged in an activi-
ty which he is authorized to undertake and 
which is calculated to further, directly or 
indirectly, the employer's business." Pow-
ers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 
730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982). 
[2] Applying these well established 
principles to the facts of the present case, 
it is apparent that plaintiffs unfortunate 
accident neither arose out of her employ-
ment nor occurred in the course thereof. 
Although she had been instructed by her 
employer to dispose of the plants, her deci-
sion to take them to her home and hang 
them on her porch during working hours 
was motivated by purely personal consider-
ations, Le., the availability of someone to 
assist her. But for this reason, she would 
not have made the trip, and therefore she 
cannot be said to have been engaged in an 
errand undertaken in furtherance of her 
employer's business. See Ridout v. Roses 
Stores, Inc., 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642 
(1933). Moreover, plaintiffs act in stand-
ing on a chair on her front porch in order to 
adjust the device upon which she intended 
to hang the plants was clearly an act un-
dertaken for her own benefit and not "for 
the benefit of [her] employer 'to any appre-
ciable extent*", a fact determinative of 
compensability. Hoffman v. Truck Lines, 
Inc., 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 810 
(1982). The incidental benefit accruing to 
J.K. Holding Company—the disposition of 
the plants so that it could vacate its of-
fice—was not so appreciable as to render 
plaintiffs aesthetic positioning of the 
plants at her home sufficiently work relat-
ed as to justify compensation. Finally, 
plaintiffs employment with J.K. Holding 
Company did not enhance in any manner 
the risk that she might fall from a chair at 
her home, nor was such a risk incidental or 
inherent to her employment 
We are cognizant that the Workers' Com-
pensation Act is to be construed liberally, 
to the end that "benefits . . . should not be 
denied by a technical, narrow, and strict 
construction." Roper v. J.P. Stevens & 
Co., 65 N.CApp. 69, 73, 308 S.E.2d 485, 488 
(1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 309, 312 
S.E.2d 652 (1984). However, even a most 
liberal construction of the Act does not 
allow or require the Industrial Commission 
to view the evidence unrealistically. The 
evidence in this case overwhelmingly sup-
ports a finding that the plaintiff was en-
gaged in a purely personal activity when 
the accident occurred. Accordingly, the 
Opinion and Award of the Industrial Com-
mission is 
Affirmed. 
ARNOLD, J., concurs. 
PHILLIPS, J., dissents. 
PHILLIPS, Judge, dissenting. 
In my opinion the majority takes too 
narrow a view of plaintiffs employment, 
the activity that brought about her injury, 
and G.S. 97-2(6). The task that plaintiffs 
boss assigned her, clearing out the office 
and getting rid of the plants that adorned 
it, was certainly for the employer's benefit 
and how the task was carried out was left 
to her discretion with the knowledge and 
expectation that she would take some of 
the plants home and hang them up, since 
they were hanging plants. She was at the 
halfway mark in performing the task when 
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she was injured. For the task did not end 
when she and the plants left the office, or 
even when they arrived at her home; it 
included removing the plants from the of-
fice, taking them somewhere, disposing of 
them as she saw fit, and returning to the 
office if the work day was not over and 
other work remained to be done, as was the 
case. If the accident had occurred in tak-
ing the plants from the office to the car, or 
in lifting them out of the car, or on the way 
to her home, or on the way back to the 
office, the injury would have been compen-
sable though all of these acts were merely 
incidental to the task assigned of getting 
rid of the plants. Yet the majority holds 
that plaintiffs injury is not covered by the 
Act though the accident occurred while she 
was actually getting rid of the plants, the 
ultimate task she was told to do. The 
employer received the same benefit from 
plaintiff hanging the plants on her porch— 
the disposition of the plants—as it would 
have received if she had put them in.a 
garbage dump or given them to a stranger; 
and that plaintiff also received a benefit 
from the method of disposition that she 
was free to select is in my opinion beside 
the point In my view plaintiffs injury 
arose out of and in the course of her em-
ployment, and the Commission's finding 
and conclusion to the contrary was error. 
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grocery store, and she appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 75 N.CApp. 79, 330 
S.E.2d 271, remanded for further hearings 
on voluntariness of defendant's in-custody 
confession. The Superior Court, Alamance 
County, Robert L. Farmer, J., held that 
defendant's in-custody statement was vol-
untarily and understanding^ made, and 
she appealed. The Court of Appeals, Phil-
lips, J., held that: (1) sufficient evidence 
supported finding that confession was vol-
untary, and (2) confession was not rendered 
involuntary by defendant's belief she 
would receive preferential treatment if she 
confessed where remarks suggested no re-
ward. 
Affirmed. 
Becton, J., concurred in result 
1. Criminal Law <3=>414 
Finding that defendant's in-custody 
statement to police was voluntarily and 
understandingiy made based on totality of 
evidence was amply supported by compe-
tent evidence. 
2. Criminal Law «=»519(1) 
Mere fact that a confession is made 
after defendant is confronted with new in-
formation normally calling for explanation 
does not render confession involuntary. 
3. Criminal Law «=»519(9) 
Defendant's in-custody confession was 
not rendered involuntary by her belief, al-
legedly based on officers' remarks, that 
she would be rewarded if she confessed, 
where remarks suggested no reward and 
were too speculative to warrant such belief 
by defendant 
Angela Evans WALDEN. 
No. 8615SC233. 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina. 
Oct 21, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted along with 
three others of common-law robbery of a 
349 S.E.2d-« 
Atty. Gen. Thornburg by Asst Atty. 
Gen. David R. Minges, Raleigh, for the 
State. 
Daniel Snipes Johnson, Graham, for de-
fendant-appellant 
PHILLIPS, Judge. 
[11 This case has been here before. In 
1983, after being convicted along with 
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SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, Division A 
54 So, 2d 686; 1951 Fla. LEXIS 1760 
November 2 ]0<] 
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Watkins & Cohen, Tallahassee, and i 
West Palm Beach, for appellant. 
Culver Smith, and Earnest, Lewis,, Smith & Jones, 
all of West Palm. Beach, and 'Wendell C Heaton, 
Tallahassee, for appellees. 
JUDGES: ROBERTS, Justice, SEBRING, C . I , and 
CHAPMAN, J., and DICKINSON, Associate Justice, 
concur. 
< ; b r r < S 
OPINION: [*687] ROBERTS, Justice. 
This is a workmen's compensation case in which 
the Deputy Commissioner, the Florida Industrial 
Commission, and the Circuit Court of Palm Beach 
County held successively that the claimant, appel-
lant here, was not entitled to compensation under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 440, Florida 
Statutes. 
The undisputed facts are, in substance, as follows: 
Appellant is the vice president and manager of The Youth 
Shop, Inc. One of his duties as such employee was to 
record the daily sales of the store, and it was his custom 
to take the books home with him at night and make up his 
report at home, generally in the morning before depart-
ing for work. He was not required to do so, although 
"under the policy of the firm" he was authorized to do so. 
On the morning in question, the appellant arose at 7:00 
A.M. , worked for an hour on the [**2] store records in 
an "office" adjoining his bedroom on the second floor of 
his home, and then descended the stairs to the first floor 
to have breakfast and then go on to the store. He was 
carrying his daily record book and some other papers 
in a folder. While descending the stairs, he slipped and 
fell, sustaining a fractured shoulder and other injuries. 
The sole question here is whether the appellant's in-
_•>.: •: se ' oi it :>f and in the :oi n s s of empI ::n ment' '"', 
within le mea n ing o f Se :tion 4 10 „ 09 I "loi: ida S tati ites. 
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as 
expressed in Protectu Awning Shutter Co. et al. v. 
Cline, 154 Fla.. 30, 16 So.2d 342, 343, is "to shoul-
der on industry the expense incident to the hazards of 
industry; to lift from the public the burden to support 
those incapacitated by industry and to ultimately pass 
on to the consumers of the products of industry such 
expense." Since industry must carry the burden, there 
must then be some causal connection between the em-
ployment and the injury, or it must have had its origin 
in some risk incident to or connected with the employ-
ment, or have followed from it as a natural consequence. 
General Properties Co. v. Greening, [**3] 154 Fla. 
814, 18 So. 2d 908; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New 
York v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495; Sweat v. 
Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348. While there is a 
presumption that the claim comes within the provisions 
of the Act, the claimant is not relieved of the burden of 
proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of 
employment. Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey?, 155 
Fla. 769, 21 So 2d 451. 
When tested by the above rules, appellant's injury can-
not be said to have arisen "out of and in the course of 
his employ ment." The appellant was not on the stairs 
because of his employment; he would [*688] have been 
there in any event, regardless of whether he had brought 
his work home from the store. If the appellant had been 
required to do the work at his home, then there might 
be some justification for saying that his employer had 
assumed the risks incident to performing the work on 
appellant's own premises with the consequent liability 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This question 
is not here presented, however, and we do not decide it. 
In London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, 190 Cal. 587, 213 P. 977, 978f 
the claimant had, with [**4] his employer's approval, 
taken some work to his own home to do. He arrived 
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there about 11:00 o'clock and, after finishing his cal-
culations at about 12:30 o'clock, he ate his lunch. As 
he was leaving his home for the purpose of returning to 
the office, he slipped on a hardwood floor in his home 
and sustained an injury. In holding that the injury did 
not arise out of the course of his employment, the coun 
said: "* * having remained in his home after the com-
pletion of the work for the purpose of taking his lunch, 
his object in going there was accomplished, and his ser-
vice to his employer was not resumed until his return 
to his place of employment; and that the carrying of the 
computations to the office was merely incidental to his 
main purpose of returning there. He is in no different 
position than if he had gone to a restaurant for his lunch 
and had there slipped on the floor, or if he had finished 
his work in his home late in the afternoon, and had re-
mained at home until the following morning, intending 
to take the computations with him to the office at that 
time. We think therefore that his injury, suffered under 
the circumstances detailed, was not one coming within 
the provisions [**5] of the act." 
See also Morgan v. Hoage, 63 App.D.C. 355, 72 
E2d 727; Scanlon v. Herald Co., 201 App.Div. 173, 
194 N.Y.S. 663; Industrial Commission of Colorado v. 
Anderson, 69 Colo. 147, 169 R 135, L.R.A.1918F, 
885; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Gintert, 128 
Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400, 92 A.L.R. 1032, for de-
cisions of courts of other states in which the facts are 
somewhat similar to those in the instant case. 
For the reasons stated, the order of affirmance of the 
Circuit Court should be and it is hereby 
Affirmed. 
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Oscar William Loyd, Appellant, v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, Appellee 
No. 6810 
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana 
280 S.W.2d 955; 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 1942 
June 16, 1955 
CORE TERMS: telephone, ladder, vacation, summary judgment, answered, staned, paint, subject to call, 
issue of fact, conversation, furtherance, painting, embalmer, slipped, phone, leg 
OPINIONBY: [**1] 
HALL 
OPINION: [*955] HALL, Chief Justice. 
This is an action by appellant against appellee for com-
pensation for an injury claimed by appellant to have oc-
curred in the course of his employment as an embalmer 
with Burks-Walker-Tippit Funeral Home in Tyler, Texas. 
Upon motion of appellee the trial court rendered a sum-
mary judgment for it and against appellant. 
Appellant brings forward one point to the effect that 
the trial court erred in rendering a summary judgment 
for the reason that there was a genuine "issue of fact as 
to whether appellant was injured while engaged in or 
about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his 
employer." 
The evidence shows that appellant was employed by 
Burks-Walker-Tippit Funeral Home as an embalmer. On 
the date of his injury he was on his vacation, but un-
der his employment he was subject to call at any time. 
Shortly before his injury he had [*956] gone to Tennessee 
on a vacation. On his return home he notified his em-
ployer that he was in the city, subject to call even though 
his vacation period had not ended. 
The facts with respect to his injury are: Appellant was 
engaged in painting the side of his house; he was stand-
ing on a [**2] ladder holding a paintbrush and a bucket 
of paint when he heard his telephone ring. He started 
down the ladder with his paint and brush when the foot 
of the ladder slipped, causing him to fall to the ground, 
breaking his leg. He never answered the telephone and 
there is no evidence as to who was calling him. He al-
leges that as part of his employment he was required to 
maintain a telephone in his residence. With reference to 
how the accident happened, appellant testified: 
"I staned to get off the ladder to answer the phone. 
The phone was ringing. I started to get down and the 
ladder slipped. I didn't want to spill the paint and I fell 
on this leg (pointing)." 
It is a cardinal rule pronounced many times in this 
state that to sustain a judgment for a claimant the ev-
idence must show that his injury occurred during the 
course of his employment or is so intimately related to 
his employment as to be a part of it. In our opinion, the 
evidence wholly fails to show that on the occasion of ap-
pellant's injury he was doing anything in furtherance of 
his employer's business. The evidence positively shows 
that he was painting his house at the time of the injury 
and while on vacation. [**3] It is true that he was in-
jured while getting down from the ladder to answer the 
telephone, but there is no evidence in the record that he 
ever answered it or that any one answered it for him, 
nor is there any evidence that the call was from his em-
ployer. The call could have been from some friend or a 
member of his family, or even a "wrong number." 
We are cited by appellant to the case of Security Union 
Ins. Co. v. McClurkin, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 240, 
242, w/r. In that case the employer maintained a tele-
phone in appellee's home. On the occasion of the em-
ployee's injury the facts as stated in the opinion were: 
"In going to the telephone, placed in his apartment by his 
employer for the purpose of communicating with him, 
to answer a call from his employer, the appellee was 
performing the duties of his employment and furthering 
the business of his employer, and the injury received by 
him in answering the call was one having to do with and 
originating in the work or business of his employer." 
The facts in that case show further that after the call had 
been completed, the employee stepped on a needle in his 
home and received an injury which was held compens-
able. 
There are two differences [**4] between that case and 
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the case at bar. In the McClurkin case the injury oc-
curred after the employee received instructions from his 
employer, and, second, the facts showed that in the 
McClurkin case the conversation was with the employer 
and concerned the business of the employer. And in said 
conversation the employee received certain instructions 
from his employer to be performed the next morning. 
As stated above there is nothing in this record to show 
who was calling on appellee's telephone, or whether the 
call was for him or some one else or from his employer 
or some one else. 
In such circumstances the evidence viewed in the light 
most favorable to appellant does not raise an issue of 
fact and the trial court was justified in rendering the 
summary judgment. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
DAVIS, J., not sitting. 
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SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] 
Leave to appeal applied for. 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
COUNSEL: John J. Fitzgerald, for plaintiff. 
Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski), for de-
fendant. 
JUDGES: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Cynar and J. W. 
Fitzgerald, * J J. 
* Retired Supreme Court justice, sitting on the 
Court of Appeals by assignment. 
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM 
OPINION: [*183] [**520] Margaret A. Owen's hus-
band, Robert L. Owen, died of a heart attack on 
February 4, 1979. Plaintiff filed a claim for disabil-
ity compensation. After an administrative hearing the 
hearing referee ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation. Defendant appealed to the Worker's 
Compensation Appeal Board. The WCAB affirmed the 
decision of the referee. Defendant applied for leave to 
appeal to this Court. Leave was granted on September 
18, 1984. We reverse. 
The WCAB made the following findings of fact. The 
decedent was required to travel as part of his employment 
at Chrysler Corporation. He was scheduled to drive 
from his home in Metamora to Metropolitan Airport and 
depart on a 3:15 p.m. flight to Lebanon, Pennsylvania. 
The weather was [*184] very bad; conditions were 
"blizzard-like" and the wind-chill factor was 25 degrees 
[***2] below zero. Owen decided to get an early start; 
under clear weather conditions it would take an hour 
and a half to get to the airport. Between 10:00 a.m. and 
10:15 a.m. he went outside and was preparing to move 
his car into his garage in order to load his suitcase. In 
order to do this, Owen had to move the family's truck 
which was parked in front of the car. The truck was 
stuck in a snowbank. The decedent and his wife shov-
eled out snow and attempted to push the truck. Decedent 
suffered an acute myocardial infarction and died while 
attempting to extricate the truck from the snow. 
The WCAB found that decedent had a history of heart 
problems. A doctor testified that the exertion that morn-
ing contributed to decedent's heart attack. The WCAB 
found that moving the car in order to load it was part of 
decedent's special mission for his employer and, there-
fore, that decedent's injury arose out of and in the course 
of his employment. The WCAB affirmed the decision of 
the referee. 
The issue in this case is whether the WCAB erred in 
concluding that the death [**521] occurred in the course 
of decedent's employment. Review of WCAB decisions 
is limited to questions of law; factual [***3] findings 
by the WCAB are conclusive in the absence of fraud if 
there is any competent evidence to support them. Jones 
v TRW, Inc, 139 Mich App 751; 362 NW2d 801 (1984); 
Upton v General Motors Corp, 124 Mich App 61; 333 
NW2d 384 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100.12 (1983). 
This Court may, however, review the WCAB's resolu-
tion of questions of law. Jones, supra. 
In order to be compensable, an employee's injury 
must arise out of and be in the course of the em-
ployee's employment. MCL 418.301(1); MSA [*185] 
17.237(301)(1). Generally, injuries sustained while an 
employee is going to and from work are not compens-
able. Denny v Kostadinovski, 117 Mich App 517; 324 
NW2d 19 (1981). An exception to this rule is that com-
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pensation may be awarded where the employee is on a 
"special mission" for the benefit of the employer. Jones, 
supra. The question is whether the decedent had em-
barked on his special mission when he suffered his in-
jury. 
In Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 
Mich 444, 452; 320 NW2d 858 (1982), the Michigan 
Supreme Court stated: 
"When an employee, having identifiable time and 
space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises 
journey [***4] which would normally not be covered 
under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may 
be brought within the course of employment by the fact 
that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the 
special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making 
it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently 
substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the ser-
vice itself. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 
16.10, p 4-123 (footnotes omitted)." 
In Ream vLE Myers Co, 72 Mich App 238; 249 NW2d 
372 (1976), this Court upheld an award by the WCAB 
where the employee was injured while traveling on a 
special assignment for his employer. Ream is like the 
case at bar. The trip was outside the normal performance 
of the decedent's duties and was clearly of special bene-
fit to the employer. Traveling to the airport was pan of 
the special mission and thus the injury suffered during 
the trip was compensable. 
We must still decide when the decedent's special mis-
sion commenced. The factors considered in deciding if 
the preparatory acts fall within the scope of a special 
mission should be viewed liberally in [*186] light of the 
remedial nature of the workers' compensation [***5] 
scheme. 
We do not agree with defendant's contention that 
the identifiable point in time and space when and 
where decedent's special mission commenced was the 
Northwest Airlines parking lot. 
Plaintiff contends that the decedent had commenced 
his special mission when he and plaintiff were attempt-
ing to move the family truck, standing between his car 
and the garage, to enable the car to be driven into the 
garage. The purpose of driving the car into the garage 
was to place his suitcase in the car. 
In our opinion moving the car into the garage for pur-
poses of placing a suitcase in the car was at most prepa-
ration for the eventuality of travel. The activity was not 
within the scope of the special mission so as to support 
an award of compensation. 
The decision of the WCAB is reversed. 
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to be used and who'd pay for gas or make 
any contribution to truck expense) . 
Nor could we suppose that plaintiff and 
his uncle impliedly agreed that, if one was 
dr iving his t ruck and caused damages, that 
both would be responsible as par tners for 
damages caused. In fact, each maintained 
insurance on his own truck, and there was 
never any accounting among them as to 
such costs. 
Only on a long trip (e. g., to Mississip-
pi) 'would one pay gas and the other supply 
the truck. Ordinar i ly they simply "took 
t u r n s " supplying the truck. 
[2] W e conclude that defendnat con-
t rac tor ' s a r rangements with two (or more) 
siding applicators did not constitute the ap-
plicators a par tnership or cause any differ-
ent result for workmen's compensation 
purposes than contract ing with a single ap-
plicator. R.S. 23:1021 subd. (6) is applica-
ble and § 1063 is not. 
[3] T o reach the contrary result would 
defeat the purpose of § 1021 subd. (6) . 
T h e workman-par tner entitled to comp 
from a § 1061 principal would owe it back 
(or at least his virile share, sec C.C. ar ts . 
2872, 2873) because the partner , unlike the 
corporate shareholder, is not insulated 
from the legal entity 's liability. See Ber-
sudcr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv . Inc., 273 
So.2d 46 (La.App.1973). Thus the work-
man-par tner would both owe to the princi-
pal and be owed by the principal, and con-
fusion, C.C. ar t . 2217, would extinguish (at 
least his virile share of) the comp liability. 
[4] Wc do, however, reject plaintiff 's 
claim for penalties including at torney's 
fees. The legal issues were far from clear 
because of the breadth of our par tnership 
definition and the t reatment of par tners by 
the courts in respect to compensation. We 
do not find defendant insurer was "arbi-
t rary , capricious, or without probable 
cause", R.S. 22:658. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Marian C. Wuertz QUAGLINO, wife of 
Anthony W. Quagllno, Deceased 
v. 
ACE BAKERY, DIVISION OF LAKELAND 
BAKERY, INC. and the Hanover In-
surance Group of New York. 
No. 5588. 
Court of Appeal of Loittainnii, 
Fourth Circuit. 
April 3, 1973. 
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1973. 
Employee's wi fe , sued for workmen's 
compensation benefits payable on death_of 
her husband. T h e Civil District Court , 
Parish of Orleans, No. 465-524, Richard J. 
Garvey, J., dismissed wife's claim, and she 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schott , 
J., held that evidence that employee, who 
was stipervispiL and general manager of 
bakery, had brought home from bakery an 
e le^hjcJ3lowjex r - j£ lUngJi is_j^eJie_i iad_to 
test it, as he had on three or four occa-
sions over the prior four or five years , and 
was thereafter electrocuted while blowing' 
away grass clippings with blower,_did not 
establish that cjmrjloyee was acting for_em-
ployer and not merely pursuing his own 
business or pleasure. 
Affirmed. 
Gulotta, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <®=>!69l 
In order to determine whether acci-
dent arose out of employment it is neces-
sary to consider whether employee was 
then engaged about his employer's business 
and not merely pursuing his own business 
or pleasure, and whether necessities of em-
ployer's business reasonably required em-
ployee to be at place of accident at time 
accident occurred. L S A - R . S . 23:1031. 
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=»I558 
Where evidence showed that employee, 
supervisor and general manager of bakery, 
QUAGLINO v. ACE BAKERY, DIV. OF LAKELAND BAKERY, ita,. 
Cite as. Ln.App., 275 So.2d 874 &?5 
brought home blower used to blow flour 
out of cracks in bakery machinery in order 
to test it, as he had done on three or four 
occasions over previous five years, and em-
ployee was electrocuted while blowing 
grass clippings from driveway with blower, 
evidence was not sufficient to show that at 
time of accident employee was acting for 
employer and not merely pursuing his own 
business or pleasure. L S A - R . S . 23:1031. 
Garon, Brener & McNeely, Milton E. 
Brener , New Orleans, for plaintiff-appel-
lant. 
Adams & Reese, Edward J. Rice, Jr., 
New Orleans, for defendants-appellees. 
Before R E D M A N N , G U L O T T A and 
S C H O T T , JJ . 
S C H O T T , Judge. 
T h e plaintiff has taken this appeal from 
a judgment which dismissed her claim for 
Workmen ' s Compensation benefits arising 
out of the death of her husband on July 
17, 1966. The issue in this case is whether 
decedent 's death was the result of "acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of his 
employment" so that it was covered by 
L S A - R . S . 23:1031. 
At the time of his death decedent had 
been employed by the defendant bakery for 
23 years and was the supervisor and gener-
al manager . His duties were such that he 
was on call at all times. His fatal accident 
occurred at his home on a Sunday after-
noon. 
On the day before his death decedent 
had brought home an cJe^cjTJc_[)|ovyej of the 
type which was used in the bakery for the 
purpose of blowing flour from crevices and 
cracks and from the machinery in the bak-
ery. The plaintiff testified that she had 
seen this blower on three or four occasions 
over the four or five years previous to the 
accident when her husband had brought 
the machine home in order to oil it, clean 
it or brush it out. On the day of the acci-
dent, the plaintiff had been engaged in her 
housework and while she was in the ga-
rage running her clothes dryer she saw her 
husband occupied with the blower. She 
asked him what he was doing with the ma-
chine, to which he replied, "I really just 
have to test it," or words to that effect. 
The house occupied by plaintiff and her 
husband consisted of a 4-bedroom frame 
dwelling in the City of New Orleans with 
a garage located to the rear of the house. 
Facing the house there was a driveway on 
the left side leading from the street to the 
garage and consisting of paved strips, 
being about 30 or 10 feet from the front of 
the house to the garage. 
At some point in time on this fatal day 
the plaintiff had trimmed the grass along 
the side of one of the concrete strips of 
the driveway by means of an electric edg-
er, having started from the garage and 
having worked just past the front gate 
which was near the street when she inter-
rupted this chore and returned to the in 
side of her house to look after ber cooking. 
She then heard the blower in operation for 
two or three minutes_ajid then stepped out 
of her kitchen in order to rairiicT"husT)a7i7l 
in for his meal. At that time he was in 
the process of moving from the garage 
down the driveway to the front gate, using 
the blower with an extension cord in order 
to remove the blades of grass from the 
driveway. When his wife called him he 
answered, "I'm killing two birds with one 
stone, I'm testing," o r w o r d s to that efTecJ. 
The plaintiff watched her husband move 
with the blower in his hand toward the 
front gate and at the time that he reached 
the front gate he put his hand on top of 
the gate in order to open the latch, where-
upon he was electrocuted. 
The two statements by the decedent, one 
while he was in the garage and the other 
while he was using the blower along his 
Idriveway, were both objected to by defend-
ants but the trial judge overruled the 
objections and admitted the statements into 
} 
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evidence. In this Court the defendants 
have urged that this ruling was incorrect 
and contend that the statements should be 
disregarded. For our purposes, we need 
not pass upon the admissibility of those 
statements because the result is the same 
whether the statements are admissible or 
not. 
Plaintiff proved from the autopsy report 
and the Assistant Coroner who examined 
the decedent that his death was caused by 
a heart attack resulting from an electrical 
shock. According to the report, the time 
of death was 5:20 PM. Plaintiff also 
proved from the testimony of an electrical 
engineer and expert who inspected the 
blower and the extension cord after the ac-
cident that the cause of the accident was 
the fact that al though the wiring system in 
the machine consisted of three wires which 
would necessitate a three-pronged cap for 
proper performance, this part icular ma-
chine incorrectly had a two-prong cap at-
tached to the wires of the machine and 
plugged into a two-wire extension cord so 
that depending upon how the plug was in-
serted into the electric outlet, electricity 
would either be grounded at the outlet or 
surge through the frame of the machine. 
When the decedent touched the steel page 
fence gate while holding the machine his 
body was grounded causing electric current 
to surge through his body. 
I It is plaintiff 's position that at the time 
I of his death her husband was testing the 
I blower for the benefit of his employer so, 
I that his death was covered for Workmen 's 
Compensation even though he may at the 
same time of his death have been engaged 
in^ the personal business of blowing_±h£ 
grass from his driveway. Plaintiff con-
tends that her husband's death was there-
fore from accident arising out of and in 
the course of his employment. Plaintiff 
I relies on the principle of law enunciated in 
Keller v. Wallace Industr ial Contractors , 
(La.App. 1st Cir. 1969) 224 So.2d 3 1 : 
" . . . a n employee, whose job gives 
him wide latitude in car ry ing out his du-
f ties, can be engaged in the personal mis-
sion, and at the same time, be furthering 
the interests of his employer. The two 
l interests are not mutually exclusive." 
V 
At the trial, the defendants offered evi-
dence to show that shortly after the acci-
dent plaintiff stated to several individuals 
that her husband had been using the blow-
er to blow grass off the sidewalk without 
making any reference to the fact that he 
was testing the machine. Fur thermore , de-
fendants raise the question as to whether 
the blower did in fact belong to Ace Bak-
ery based on a statement made by plaintiff 
to the bakery's owner shortly after the ac-
cident that she did not know where he had 
gotten the blower. The owner and two of 
the bakery 's employees all testified that 
they had the same type of blower in the 
bakery but there was a three-prong plug. 
Finally, the plaintiff testified that there 
were electrical plugs and outlets in the ga-
rage where the decedent was working be-
fore the accident, and defendants contend 
that if he was testing the blower for the 
benefit of the bakery there was no need 
for him to leave the garage in order to 
complete that operation. Unquestionably, 
these factors developed by defendants tend 
to weaken plaintiff 's case but for purposes 
of this appeal they may be disregarded in 
order to provide her with the full benefit 
of any doubt. 
[1] In order for the plaintiff to re-
cover, she must prove that her husband's 
death occurred by reason of an accident 
ar is ing out of and in the course of his em-
ployment. In the case of Kern v. South-
port Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19, it was 
held that in order to determine whether the 
accident arose out of the employment it is 
necessary to consider (1) was the employee 
then engaged about his employer's business 
and not merely pursuing his own business 
or p leasure ; (2) did the necessities of that 
employer 's business reasonably require the 
employee be at the place of the accident at 
the time the accident occurred? 
QUAGLINO v. ACE BAKERY, DIV. OF LAKELAND BAKERY, INC. 
Cite ns. Ln.App.. 275 S»>.2d S74 
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When these tests enunciated in the Kern 
case were discussed in Keller v. Wallace 
Industrial Contractors , supra, the Court 
held that each case of this type must be de-
cided in the light of its own circumstances. 
See also Courville v. National Food Stores 
of Louisiana, Inc., 174 So.2d 251 (La.App., 
3d Cir. 1965). 
[2] In the final analysis, plaintiff 's 
case rests only upon evidence which fairly 
establishes that the blower belonged to the 
bakery and upon the two statements made 
by decedent to plaintiff that he was testing 
the blower in the ga rage and was still test-
ing the machine while blowing the grass 
from his dr iveway when his wife called 
him to come inside. At that point he con-
tinued to blow the cutt ings along the drive-
way and apparently intended to go out of 
the gate and complete his task when the 
fatal electrocution occurred. 
In the first place, the evidence is not 
/ sufficient to show that at the time he was 
/ electrocuted the decedent was acting for 
( his employer and not merely pursuing his 
\ o w i i business or pleasure. 
There is no evidence to explain what de-
cedent meant by this " tes t ing" or to show 
the reason for or the extent of such a pro-
cedure. The " tes t ing" he spoke of may 
have been necessary in his mind only be-
cause of the disastrous plug change which 
directly linked the blower case to one side 
of the 120-volt line. 
Fur thermore , there was no evidence to 
/ prove that decedent brought the machine 
/ home for a business purpose in the first 
V place. The bakery blower had been re-
paired not long before this incident and 
there was no testimony that there was any 
problem with the blower at the bakery. It 
may be that the only work decedent did on 
the blower was to change its three-prong 
plug for a two-prong plug, to facilitate 
personal use of the blower with his house's 
two-prong sockets or his two-connector ex-
tension cord. While it does seem improba-
ble that decedent would have brought the 
I blower home for the purpose of blowing 
I grass cuttings off pavement, he may have intended some other personal use. 
Thus, when plaintiff's evidence is evalu-
ated there is not a preponderance to meet 
the first test of the Kern case. 
Furthermore, even if we were to assume 
that decedent did bring the machine home 
to test it for his employer's benefit, in or-
der for plaintiff to recover it must also be 
• determined that the necessity of testing the 
(machine reasonably required the decedent 
Ito continue with the operation of the blower 
I to the gate and then presumably beyond 
Ithe gate. This strains the facts and cir-
Icumstances of the case to produce an in-
ference which does not follow. It hardly 
seems likely that it was necessary for the 
d^cjpdgnt to leave the confines of his ga-
rage in_onjer to complete his test. Fven if 
he had walked a few feet i nto the drive -
way wi t l^ the^machnic 11 m ight _be__argued 
that this was necessary in order to com-
plete his test, hut we know that he__had 
1 gone the full 30 to -10 feet of the driveway 
(in blowing the grass cutt ings until he 
(reached the gate and then he must have in-
Jtended to leave the confines of the yard at 
( the time his accident happened. There is 
no evidence to show that his action at that 
point was reasonably required in order to 
accomplish any testing of the mjahinc. 
When the facts and circumstances of the 
instant case are submitted to the tests 
enunciated in the Kern case, the conclusion 
. is that plaintiff did not prove by a prcpon-
I derancc of the evidence that decedent's 
I death arose out of his employment by de-
I fendant Ace Hakcry. 
Affirmed. 
( i l ' L O T T A . Judge (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
The evidence shows that Ouaglino, as 
general manager of the bakery with the re-
sponsibility of supervision over its opera-
tion, occasionally took bakery equipment 
home for repair or cleaning, or both, ft is 
clear, from the evidence, that the blower 
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was one used in the bakery. Fur thermore , 
it appears from the evidence that it is 
more reasonable and probable that the 
blower was brought home by the decedent 
to repair or clean than to be used for the 
purpose of blowing grass cutt ings It is 
also more reasonable, from the record, that 
the machine was being used by the dece-
dent in fur therance of its testing for the 
benefit of the employer or the business 
Once wc conclude that Quaglino was, in 
fact, test ing the blower by blowing grass 
from the dr iveway, any inference or conclu-
sion that when he intended to blow grass 
cut t ings be>ond the gate , he converted the 
use to his own purposes is purely specula-
tive 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that 
plaintiff successfully carr ied the burden of 
showing that the death of Quaglino oc-
curred from an accident ar is ing out of and 
in the course of his employment 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
Doris Eiermann BORDELON, Individually, 
and as the Administrator of the Estate 
of her minor children 
v. 
TULANE INDUSTRIAL LAUNDRY, INC. 
and the Phoenix Insurance Company. 
No 5610. 
Couit of Appeal of LouKi uui, 
Fourth Clicuit 
Apnl 'I, V)T\ 
HclietuitiK P C I I K M I May 1, 107 \ 
Action was brought to recover death 
benefits on behalf of deceased workman 
The Civil Distr ict Court for the Parish of 
Orleans , Division " H " , No 476-644, Oliver 
P C a r n e r e , J , entered decree awarding 
benefits and the employer and insurance 
carr ier appealed T h e Court of Appeal, 
Gulotta, J , held that there was substantial 
evidence to support conclusion of a causal 
connection between severe blow to abdo 
men of deceased who had had no medical 
problems until automobile accident and the 
ensuing death of employee about six 
months later as a result of, among other 
things, a blood clot in the mesenteric and 
portal vein causing deter iora t ion and death 
of lower bowel and upper colon, despite 
testimony to the effect that death resulted 
from deceased's obesity 
Affirmed 
I. Workmen's Compensation €=>554 
Employer takes an employee as he 
finds him 
2 Workmen's Compensation <S=>I58I 
There was substantial evidence to sup-
port conclusion of a causal connection be 
tween severe blow to abdomen of deceased, 
who had had no medical problems until 
automobile accident and the ensuing death 
of employee about six months later as a re 
suit of, among other things, a blood clot in 
the mesenteric and portal vein causing de-
terioration and death of lower bowel and 
upper colon, despite testimony to the effect 
that death resulted from deceased's obesity 
Porteous, Toledano, Hainkel & Johnson, 
James L Donovan, New Orleans , for de-
fendants-appellants 
Windhorst , Heisler, De Laup & W y -
socki, Henry L Klein, New Orleans , for 
plaintiff appellee 
Before R E D M A N N , G U L O T T A and 
S C H O T T , J J 
G U L O T T A , Judge 
This is an appeal from a judgment 
awarding death benefits under workmen's 
compensation as a result of injuries re-
ceived in an accident which occurred on 
BORDELON v TULANE IND 
Cite iv I n \|»p 
April 21, 1967 when the decedent, \ l ton If 
Bordelon, was driving his laundrv truck 
while in the course and scope of his em 
plo>ment Defendants seek reversal on the 
ground that the death was not accident 
connected but resulted from the decedent's 
obesity and complications caused there 
from 
The injuries sustained bv Bordelon were 
a deep skin abrasion—left arm, an abrasion 
of the dorsum—left hand contusion with 
ecchymosis left lower rib area—mid auxil 
lary line, cel lul i t is1 of the abdomen wall 
Bordelon died November 23, 1967 at the 
age of 34 
The autopsy report showed that death 
resulted from the following conditions a 
blood clot in the mesenteric and portal vein 
causing deteriorat ion and death of the low 
er bowel and upper colon, i n inflamma 
tion of the abdominal w i l l , congestion in 
the liver, spleen and kidnev resulting from 
high blood pressure causing enlargement of 
the hear t muscle , fattv metamorphosis of 
the l iver , marked obesity (380 pounds) 
Pickwickian svndrome (clinical), i e , in 
adequate function of the lung resulting in 
drowsiness and sleepiness fluid in the 
lungs and legs 
The record shows that Bordelon, al 
though obe^e, was active and healthy until 
April 21, 1967, when he suffered, in the 
accident, a severe blow to his abdomen 
From that date forward, a man with no 
prior medical problems began a downhill 
t rek toward his death His deterioration 
from the date of the accident was constant 
and consistent 
Bordelon was first seen bv Dr A \ 
Houston on April 21, 1967 Conservative 
t rea tment with the use of antibiotics result 
ed in no improvement Although Bordelon 
had re turned to his former emplovment 
subsequent to the accident, because of Ins 
failure to respond to treatment , he was or 
dered by Dr Houston on May 17, 1967, to 
USTRIAL LAUNDRY, INC La 8 7 9 
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discontinue work A report bv. Dr Hous 
ton indicated that Bordelon on May 29 was 
not making progress so far as his abdomi-
nal wall is concerned " 
\ \ annna t ion by Dr \ or tunato J Padua 
on July 29 revealed an infection of both 
ears He found, further, wheezing in the 
chest as well i s the abdomen tender to dig 
ital palpitation There were two hard 
masses about the size of small pecans over 
both rectus abdominis muscles, which, ac 
cording to Dr Padua, was possibly the re 
suit of previous hematoma It was bis 
opinion that the trauma to the abdomen 
leaving the decedent with the large masses 
caused internal injury to the portal vein 
and internal organs resulting eventuall) in 
the portal thrombosis The trauma, in his 
opinion, is connected to the thrombosis 
Fur ther examination bv Dr Padua on \ u 
gust H revelled t i n t Bordelon was suffer 
nig from "congestive he i r t fa i lure ' l)i 
Padua suggested further examination l>\ 
an internist 
Dr Henry K Ibrecfoot, an internist, 
saw the decedent on August 18 and 20 
He found swelling of the abdomen and dif 
ficult} in breathing On his advice, Bor 
delon was hospitalized on \ugus t 27, 1%7 
and treated with a svsteni of diuretics and 
dch>dratcs to remove fluid He w i s dis 
charged on \ugus t M \ t t in t tunc, Bor 
delon weighed }S7 pounds- Dr Ibrecfoot 
was of the opinion th it there is causal con 
nection between the injury to the abdomen 
e uisiiig the infection resulting in the portal 
\ n n thrombosis, which iccording to the 
atttops> report w is one of the causes of 
death He explained th it the cause of the 
portal vein thrombosis is most eommonlv 
infection in the art i of the lbdormii, p i r 
ticularl) the umbilicus /navel) arc» frc 
quentlv associated with fluid in the abdo 
men 
His tcstunori) was supported b\ t in t of 
Dr Sidney Jacobs, i lso an internist, who 
indicated that such a trauma as suffered 
I Cellulitis according to Dr Henrj Three 
foot, an internist who testified is in in 
f lnmmntion or inf i rMon '»f t in tissue im 
modn t f l } tunpnth fh» skin 
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mils him to do. West's Ann.Cn}.Labor Code 
s 3000. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
lot other |udicial constructions and del-
iniiioiis. 
i\. Workers' Compensation C=>ol7 
Employee acts within "course of his em-
ployment." for workers' compensation pur-
pose's, whei. performing duty imposed upon 
mm by employer and one necessary to per-
form befort terms of contract are mutually 
satisfied. West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code 
s 3fi00. 
7. Workers' Compensation O=>710 
Employer-employee relation is tempo-
rarily suspended, when employee is off duty, 
until employee reenters employer's service. 
Wests Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600. 
S. Workers' Compensation e=>604 
Where there is liability under worker?' 
com}>ensation law, right to award is founded 
not upon fact that injury grows out of and is 
incidental to employee's employment, but 
rather, upon fact that service employee is 
rendering at time of injury grows out of and 
is incidental to employment. West's 
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600. 
9. Workers' Compensation ©=>719 
Ordinarily pursuant to" going and com-
ing rule" employee cannot obtain workers' 
compensation for injury suffered while going 
to or coming from workplace. West's 
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
lor other judicial constructions and def-
initions 
1(1. Workers' Compensation e»719 
"Going and coming rule "of nonliability 
for injuries suffered while employee is going 
to or coming from workplace, applies even 
when employee who voluntarily and regularly 
takes work home is injured while commuting. 
West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 36(H). 
|MHKegel. Tobin & Truce and Nancy J. 
Hankinson, Los Angeles, for Petitioner. 
ORTER, 2d SERIES 
58 Cal.App.4th 647 
Fred M. Charness, West Hills and Barry 
Satzman, Los Angeles, for Respondent Moel-
ler. 
No appearance for Respondent Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board. 
ORTEGA, Acting Presiding Justice. 
Petitioner Ralphs Grocery Company seeks 
to annul the respondent Workers Compensa-
tion Appeals Board's award of death benefits 
to an employee's surviving minors. We con-
clude the injury was noncompensable and 
annul the award. 
JwiFACTS 
Marl: Moeller was a 32-year-old meatcut-
ter employed by Ralphs for 10 years when he 
died of a heart attack while at home on a 
Sunday evening, June 1. 1992. Moeller had 
not worked at Ralphs since October 29. 1991, 
when he went on disability leave due to an 
industrial injury to his finger. Because of 
declining sales, Ralphs laid off Moeller in 
November 1991, while he was still on disabili-
ty leave. On June 1, 1992, the day before 
Moeller was scheduled to return to work 
from the layoff, he suddenly collapsed and 
died of a heart attack.1 
On the date of death, which is also the date 
of the alleged industrial injur}', Ralphs tele-
phoned Moeller at home and told him to 
report back to work the next day, .June 2, 
1992. Ralphs offered Moeller a part-time 
meatcutter's position without benefits. This 
offer was less than what Moeller, who was in 
financial difficulty, had hoped to receive. 
Moeller had been diagnosed with colon 
cancer in May 1991, and the layoff had elimi-
nated his medical insurance benefits. After 
the layoff, Moeller had to deplete the family 
savings to pay for chemotherapy and radia-
tion treatments. Moeller's wife worked part 
time as a nurse and the couple had three 
young children to support. When Moeller 
received the back to work phone call, the 
news that he would be working only part 
time without benefits was so stressful to him 
that it triggered a sudden heart arrhythmia 
1. For reasons not evident in the record, Ralphs 
did not dispute at trial that Moeller was still 
employed by Ralphs despite having been laid off. 
58 Catl.App.4th 652 
which, due to Moeller's congenital heart mus-
cle disease, caused a fatal heart attack. 
Moeller's widow, Anna Moeller, filed a 
claim for workers' compensation death bene-
fits and petitioned to be ap|>ointed guardian 
ad litem and trustee for the minors. After 
Ralphs denied her claim, Mrs. Moeller took 
no action. Ralphs gave notice her claim 
would be dismissed unless, within 180 days, 
she filed an application to have her claim 
adjudicated. (Lab.Code, § 5404.5.) 
Mrs. Moeller filed an application, but be-
yond the 180-day period. The application 
listed herself and the three minors as appli-
cants. At that time, no guardian ad litem 
had been appointed for the minors. Ralphs 
objected that the claim had been dismissed 
by operation of law under Labor Code sec-
tion 5404.5. 
At trial, the Workers' Compensation Judge 
(WCJ) appointed Mrs. Moeller guardian ad 
litem of the three minors, joined the minors 
as parties to her j^ckum, and dismissed 
Mrs. Moeller as an applicant under Labor 
Code section 5404.5. Accordingly, the mi-
nors were the sole applicants at trial. 
The WCJ found, accepting Mrs. Moeller's 
expert medical witness' opinion and rejecting 
Ralphs' conflicting medical evidence, that the 
back-to-work phone call was so stressful it 
triggered a sudden arrhythmia and fata) 
heart attack. The WCJ further found the 
phone call arose out of and occurred during 
the course of employment, despite the undis-
puted evidence that Moeller had not worked 
at Ralphs since October 29, 1991, had been 
laid off since November 1991, and had died 
the day before he was to return to work. 
After the board rejected Ralphs' petition 
for reconsideration, Ralphs filed a writ peti-
tion seeking to vacate the award. We issued 
a writ of review. 
DISCUSSION 
HI We conclude the injury did not occur 
in the course of employment l>ecause it hap-
2. Ralphs unsuccessfully challenged the timeli-
ness of the minors' claim below and seeks writ 
review ol that adverse determination. We need 
not reach the issue in light of our determination 
"»at the injur} was not compensable. 
The minors contend, for the first time, that 
Ralphs should have named them as respondents 
or real parties in interest in the petition for 
RALPHS GROCERY CO. v. W.C.A.B. 
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pened while Moeller was off duty, off premis-
es, and performing no special business or 
service for his employer.2 
The workers' compensation system pro-
vides for compensation to injured employees 
"for any injury . . . arising out of and in the 
course of the employment and for the death 
of any employee if the injury proximately 
causes death . . . " (Lab.Code, s 3(>00.) 
This requirement is to be liberally construed 
in favor of awarding benefits. (Lab.Code. 
§ 3202.) 
[2,3J An injury is said to arise out of 
employment when it " 'occur(s] by reason of 
a condition or incident of (the| employ-
ment . . . . ' | Citation. | That is, the employ-
ment and the injury must he linked in some 
causal fashion. |Citation. 1 However,'Ii If we 
look for a causal connection between the 
employment and the injury, such connection 
need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient if 
it is a contributory cause. (Citation]' (Cita-
tion.]" (Maker v. Worker*' Camp. Appeals 
lid. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729, 733-734, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 904, 6(>1 p.2d 1058, fn. omitted.) Here, 
Ralphs does not challenge the finding that 
the injury arose out of employment. Ralphs 
states in its petition: "WOiile the telephone 
call that occurred may be deemed to arise 
out o/jfijgdecedent's employment with Peti-
tioner as it dealt with his returning to work, 
the subsequent death of Mark Moeller some-
time after said telephone call was not in the 
course and scope of his employment with 
Petitioner." 
[4-6] The course of employment require-
ment " 'ordinarily refers to the time, place, 
and circumstances under which the injury 
occurs.' (Citation.] Thus '"[a|n employee is 
in the 'course of his employment' when he 
does those reasonable things which his con-
tract with his employment expressly or impli-
edly permits him to do."' ICitation.] And, 
ipso facto, an employee acts within the 
course of his employment when ' ''performing 
a duty imposed upon him by his employer 
reconsideration. The minors assert we must dis-
miss Ralphs' writ petition as a result of that 
omission We conclude otherwise The minors 
waived the issue by failing to mention it in their 
opposition brief below. Moreovei, the minors 
mother, as guardian ad litem, was named and 
served in the proceedings below. 
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On the couch was a 12-pack of Pearl Light 
beer and in the kitchen were several empty 
12-pack beer containers. Keith admitted to 
Swanson that he had been drinking. Swan-
soi. had Keith blow into his field Alco Sensor 
which registered that Keith's blood alcohol 
wa.^  .04 percent 
Officer John Brockus testified that in May 
of 199f. he weni to Keith's house or, a domes-
tic disturbance call but found no evidence of 
a domestic disturbance. Two days later 
lirockus spoke with Keith's eight-year-old 
son Carlton at school. Carlton told him that 
he had gotten into a fight with his younger 
brother. His father came into the bedroom, 
slapped hirij in the face, pinned him to the 
floor, and punched him in the stomach three 
limes with a closed fist. 
lirockus then spoke with Mrs. Keith about 
the incident. Brockus testified that Mrs. 
Keith said that when she heard Carlton yell-
ing she went into the bedroom and saw that
 r 
M:. Keith hac. pinned Carlton to the floor, 
and C arltoi: war- crying. Shortly thereafter 
Mie noticed a red marl: on Carlton's cheek 
and saw him holding his stomach. 
Mrs. Keitn testified that she purchased the 
heer mat probation officer Swanson saw in 
the house ir. February. She had not seen 
Mi. Keith drinking alcohol, but he had con-
sumed an entire four-ounce bottle of Nyquil. 
He had been suffering from a cold and his 
sinuses and allergies were bothering him. 
Sot and Keith denied thai Keith had told 
Swanson thai he had consumed alcohol. 
DISCUSSION 
{!] Relying on People v. Promt (1989) 
215 Cal.App.8d 452. 2(i3 Cal.Rptr. 391. Keith 
contends that the admission of Brockus' tes-
timony was error. Keith concede.- thai hear-
say evidence may be admissible in -,. proba-
tion revocation Hearing, but only if k "bears a 
substantial degree of trust-worthiness." (hi, 
a: pp. 404-155. 263 Cal.Rptr. 391. i 
He argues that the trial court's reliance on 
Bnnvv and People v. Muki (19S5- 39 Cal.Md 
707, 217 Cal.Rptr. 676. 704 P.2ri 748 was 
misplaced. Those cases involved the intro-
duction of documentary hearsay evidence 
which had a high degree of trustworthiness 
which is missing here. 
In Hroimi the hearsay testimony was that 
of a police officer testifying to a police de-
partment chemist's test of cocaine seized 
from defendant's house. In Muki a car rent-
al invoice and a hotel receipt both with defen-
dant's signature were admitted into evidence. 
Keith argues that documentary evidence 
kept in the normal course of business has a 
sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted. 
Here, however, the admission of oral hearsay 
statements from a crucial witness, who has 
not been shown to be unavailable, denies 
Keith the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine a crucial witness at his hearing. (See 
Gagnon v. Scarptlli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 783, 
93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656; Morris-
sey v. Brewer (1972; 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.) 
[2] We agree with the People that Brown 
and Maki are not as circumscribed as Keith 
suggests. It matters not whether the hear-
say involves documentary evidence, but 
whether it bears a substantial degree of 
trustworthiness. (See People v. Brown, sit-
pro, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 454-455, 263 Cal. 
Rptr. 391.) Hearsay evidence that is not 
clothed with the indicia of trustworthiness, 
be it oral or documentary, is not admissible. 
Here, the trial court could reasonably con-
clude that hearsay evidence of Brockus was 
reliable and trustworthy. 
Statements made by Mrs. Keith to Broc-
kus tend to corroborate the account of the 
incident as related by Carlton to Brockus. 
She told Brockus of the fight between Carl-
ton and his brother; that Mr. Keith was on 
top of Carlton; that Carlton had a red mark 
on his face, and that he was crying and 
holding his stomach. That Mrs. Keith's cor-
roborative statements were also hearsay does 
not lessen their trustworthiness. As the 
People point out, when testifying she did not 
deny making the statements. 
Quite apart from the hearsay testimony 
pertaining to child abuse, there was evidence 
of other probation violations. Keith had 
been drinking alcohol, and there was ample, 
evidence he was in possession of alcohol not-, 
withstanding Mrs. Keith's testimony. 
nAi^t'liS GROCERY CO. v. W.C.A.B. 
58 Cal.App.4th 6 4 7 Cite as 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 161 (Cal.App. 2 Dlsl. 1997) i b l 
The first notice of probation violation al-
leged the alcohol violations. The probation 
officer recommended 60 days in county jail. 
The second notice of violation added the child 
abuse allegation. Keith persuasively argues 
that absent the child abuse incident, Keith 
would not have been sentenced to state pris-
on. Our decision, however, rests on the 
trustworthy nature of the hearsay testimony, 
not on the sentence Keith received. 
13-5] For the same reason our decision 
does not violate Keith's confrontation and 
due process rights. As the Maki court ob-
served, both Morrissey and Gagnon recog-
nized that a parole revocation hearing is 
something far different than a criminal pros-
ecution. A probation hearing should be ap-
proached with the goal of achieving flexibility 
and accommodation. Substitutes for live tes-
timony are appropriate in probation revoca-
tion hearings under appropriate circum-
stances. "The use of hearsay as substantive 
evidence at a revocation hearing is not per se 
unconstitutional." {People v. Maki, supra, 
39 Cal.3d at pp. 714-715, 217 Cal.Rptr. 676, 
704 P.2d 743, citing Euerstafjer v. Israel (7th 
Cir.1984) 726 F.2d 1231, 1234.) 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
STEVEN J. STONE, P.J., and COFFEE, 
J., concur. 
» I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
58 Cal App.4th 647 
lewRALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
Appeals Board, W.C.AJB. No. VNO 304429, 
awarded death benefits to surviving minors. 
Employer sought to annul award. The Court 
of Appeal, Ortega, Acting P.J., held that 
injur}' did not occur in course of employment. 
Annulled with directions. 
1. Workers' Compensation C»571 
Injur*}' sustained by employee when he 
learned of job reassignment and suffered 
fatal heart attack did not occur in course of 
employment, for workers' compensation pur-
poses, as it happened while employee was off 
duty, at home, and performing no social 
business or service for employer. West's 
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600. 
2. Workers' Compensation <£*610 
Injur}' "arises out of employment," for 
workers' compensation purposes, when it oc-
curs by reason of condition or incident of 
employment; that is, employment and injury 
must be linked in some causal fashion. 
West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600. 
Set publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
3. Workers' Compensation c=»598 
Causal connection between employment 
and injury, need not be sole cause of injur}', 
for injury to arise out of employment for 
workers' compensation purposes; it suffices if 
it is contributory cause. West's Ann.Cal.La-
bor Code § 3600. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD and Casey Renee Moeller, a Mi-
nor, etc., et al., Respondents. 
No. B105593. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 1. 
Oct. 17, 1997. 
Review Denied Jan. 21, 1998. 
Claimant sought workers' compensation 
4. Workers' Compensation <S=»617 
Course of employment requirement for 
workers' compensation ordinarily refers to 
time, place, and circumstances under which 
injury occurs. West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code 
§ 3600. 
5. Workers' Compensation e=>617 
Employee is in" course of his employ-
ment," for workers' compensation purposes, 
when he does those reasonable things which 
death benefits. The Workers' Compensation his employment expressly or impliedly per 
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Dorothy ROBERTS, Claimant 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Kermit STELL, d/b/a Best Western 
Motor Inn, Employer and Appellee, 
and 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 
Insurer and Appellee. 
No. 14798. 
Supreme Court of South Dakota. 
Considered on Briefs March 6, 1985. 
Decided May 1,(^985?) 
Motel resident manager who fell on 
employer's outside premises sought work-
er's compensation benefits. The Depart-
ment of Labor held that claimant failed to 
prove that her injury arose out of and in 
course of employment, and claimant ap-
pealed. The Circuit Court, Eighth Judicial 
Circuit, Lawrence County, Warren G. John-
son, J., affirmed Department's decision, 
and claimant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Henderson, J., held that claimant 
who slipped and fell on motel premises 
while going grocery shopping on her day 
off was not injured in course of her em-
ployment, even though, claimant was re-
quired to live on motel premises. 
Affirmed. 
Wuest, Circuit Judge, concurred in re-
sult and filed opinion. 
Workers' Compensation <5=>709 
Claimant who slipped and fell on motel 
premises while going grocery shopping on 
her day off was not injured in course of her 
employment, so as to be entitled to work-
er's compensation benefits, even though 
claimant, as motel manager, was required 
to live on motel premises, as grocery shop-
ping on her day off was not in course of 
her employment, ice, as alleged source of 
injury, was natural phenomenon and risk 
common to all in area, hazard did not origi-
nate in claimant's employment, and no 
causal connection existed between injury 
and her employment. SDCL 62-1-1 et 
seq., 62-1-1(2). 
Jerry C. Rachetto of Driscoll, Mattson, 
Rachetto & Christensen, Deadwood, for 
claimant and appellant. 
Terence R. Quinn of Stephens, Quinn & 
Buckmaster, Belle Fourche, for employer 
and insurer, appellees. 
HENDERSON, Justice. 
ACTION 
This is a worker's compensation case in-
volving an employee's fall on the employ-
er's outside premises. Compensation was 
denied. An appeal has been filed from the 
circuits court's Order affirming the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Or-
der of the Division of Labor and Manage-
ment, Department of Labor. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Dorothy Roberts (claimant-appellant) 
was employed as a motel resident manager 
by Kermit Stell, d/b/a Best Western Motor 
Inn (employer-appellee) in Deadwood, 
South Dakota. Claimant lived in an apart-
ment with her husband located on the mo-
tel premises just behind the office. These 
accommodations were provided to claimant 
as part of her compensation and allowed 
her to process late registrations and tele-
phone inquiries. 
On Thursday, April 7, 1983, claimant 
slipped and fell on the motel premises. She 
fractured her hip, which rendered her par-
tially and permanently disabled. Thursday i 
was claimant's regular day off and she was 
not on call or required to remain at the 
motel, but was free to come and go as she 
pleased. At the time of the accident, claim-
ant had just returned from the beauty shop 
and was leaving with her husband to go I 
grocery shopping when it is claimed that/ 
she slipped on some ice on a walkway in 
front of her apartment. Two other wit-
nesses, however, testified that there was 
ROBERTS v. STELL 
Cite ai 367 N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985) 
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no ice in the general area in which claimant 
fell. 
After the incident in question, claimant 
initially brought a civil action which result-
ed in a verdict for employer. That judg-
ment was affirmed by this Court by an 
Order dated November 30, 1984. See Rob-
erts v. Stell, 360 N.W.2d 692 (S.D.1984). 
During the pendency of the civil action, 
claimant also filed this worker's compensa-
tion action which the Department of Labor 
heard in July 1984. Following this hearing, 
the Department of Labor entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which con-
cluded, inter alia, that claimant's activities 
on April 7, 1983, were for her personal 
benefit and pleasure and were not related 
to her employment; that her injuries did 
not result from a risk or danger peculiar or 
incidental to her employment; and that 
claimant failed to prove that her injury 
arose out of and in the course of her em-
ployment. 
Claimant thereafter appealed this deci-
sion to the circuit court which affirmed the 
Department of Labor's decision. It is from 
this latter Order that claimant now appeals. 
DECISION 
DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN 
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR WHICH HELD 
THAT CLAIMANT'S INJURIES DID 
NOT_RESULTXILQM-AJ^ISK_PECU-
LIARTO HER EMPLOYMENT? WE 
HOLD THAT IT DID NOT. 
Injuries are compensable under the 
Worker's Compensation Statutes, SDCL tit. 
62, et seq., if it arises "out of and in the 
course of the employment " SDCL 62-
1-1(2). Pickrel v. Martin Bench, Inc., 80 
S.D. 376, 124 N.W.2d 182 (1963). 
For an injury to arise out of "the employ-
ment", it is necessary and sufficient that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment, but the em-
ployment need not be the direct or proxi-
mate cause of injury, it being sufficient 
if the accident had its origin in the haz-
ard to which the employment exposed the 
employee while doing his work. Ander-
son v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376. 17 
N.W.2d 913; Bergren v. S.E. Gustafson 
Construction Co., 75 S.D. 497, 68 
N.W.2d 477. The words "in the course 
of" refer to the time, place and circum-
stances under which the accident took 
place. The contents of the statute do not 
limit the application to the periods during 
which an employee is actually engaged in 
the work that he is hired to perform... . 
In other words, an employee is within the 
course of his employment if what he is 
doing is naturally related or incidental to 
his employment or he is doing that which 
his contract of employment expressly or 
impliedly authorizes. Wilson v. Dakota 
Light & Power Co., 45 S.D. 175, 186 
N.W. 828; Jacobson v. Strong & Wag-
goner, 66 S.D. 552, 287 N.W. 41; Lang v. 
Board of Education, 70 S.D. 313, 17 
N.W.2d 695. 
Krier v. Dick's Linoleum Shop, 78 S.I). 
116. 118-19, 98 N.W.2d 486, 487-88 (1959). 
See also, Bearshield v. City of Gregory, 
278 N.W.2d 166 (S.D. 1979). 
In the case at bar, as outlined above, 
claimant was required to live on her em-
ployer's property and was injured on her 
day off when she slipped and fell as she 
was leaving to go buy groceries. The De-
partment of Labor denied claimant work-
er's compensation benefits because it found 
her activities to be personal and not related 
to her employment; the injury did not re-
sult from a risk or danger peculiar or inci-
dental to her employment; and claimant 
failed to prove her injury arose out of and 
in the course of her employment. Claimant 
here contends that this decision is in error 
for two reasons. 
First, claimant argues that because she 
was required to remain on the premises 
during her regular work time, she neces-
sarily had to eat her meals there and thus 
it was a definite employment necessity to 
go grocery shopping. In effect, claimant 
seems to be arguing that because she was 
required to live on the premises and there-
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fore eat her meals there, grocery shopping* 
on her day off is "naturally related or 
incidental" to her employment and thus 
within the course of her employment Kn 
er, 98 N W 2d at 487 This contention, 
however, is without merit All persons 
gainfully employed are not permitted to go 
grocery shopping during regular working 
hours but are required to do so on their 
time off Claimant here testified that she 
did not work during the week from 11 00 
a m to 3 00 p m and was free to go during 
this time Thus claimant could go shop 
ping during this time or on her day off and 
therefore grocery shopping on her day off 
was not within the course of her employ 
ment 
Second, claimant argues that her injury 
is compensable because "the source of inju 
ry was a risk distinctly associated with the 
conditions under which claimant lived be 
cause of the requirement of remaining on 
the premises " 1A A Larson, The Lati of 
Workmen's Compensation § 24 10, at 5-
170 (1982) It is asserted that the source 
of injury was the ice on the walkway in 
front of claimant's apartment However, 
the Department of Labor s Findings of 
Fact only found that claimant slipped and 
fell on the motel premises No specific 
finding was made that ice was the cause of 
the fall in the Findings of Fact and Conclu 
sions of Law dated September 12, 1984 * 
In any event, in addition to Larson, 
claimant cites several cases from other 
states for support of the argument she is 
now making Inasmuch as these cases per 
mit recovery for injuries to employees re 
quired to live on the employer s premises, 
when such injuries are incurred off duty 
and there is no causal connection between 
the injury and the employment, and the 
accident does not have its origin in the 
hazard to which the employment exposed 
the employee, Kner, 98 N W 2d 486, their 
holdings and rationale are rejected 
Although it is a general rule of this state 
"that worker's compensation statutes 
should be liberally construed in favor of 
injured employees," Moody v L W Tyler, 
Custom Combiners, 297 N W 2d 179, 180 
(S D 1980), "it is not intended to be health, 
accident, and old age insurance and spread 
general protection over risks common to 
all and not arising out of and in the 
course of employment" Adkins v Rives 
Plating Corp, 338 Mich 265, 270, 61 
N W 2d 117, 120 (1953) (emphasis supplied) 
(quoting Simpson v Lee & Cady, 294 
Mich 460, 463, 293 N W 718, 719 (1940)) 
Assuming claimant's contention that she 
slipped on ice, the source of her injury was 
a natural phenomenon and a risk common 
to all in the Deadwood area 
Injuries arising from exposure to a natu-
ral phenomenon do not arise out of em 
ployment unless the hazard imposed 
upon the employee by reason of the em 
ployment is greater than that to which 
the public generally in the area of hazard 
is subjected 
Renshaw v Merrtgol Adler Bakery, 212 
Neb 662, 664, 325 N W 2d 46, 48 (1982) 
The hazard did not originate in claimant's 
employment Her employment did not sub 
ject her to any greater risk from this ha7 
ard than that endured by the public at 
large, and no causal connection existed be-
tween the injury and her employment It 
therefore cannot be asserted that the inju 
ry, which claimant regrettably suffered, 
arose out of and in the course of her em 
ployment 
Affirmed 
FOSHEIM, C J , and WOLLMAN and 
MORGAN, U, concur 
WUEST, Circuit Judge, Acting as Su 
preme Court Justice, concurs in result 
WUEST, Acting Justice (concurring in 
result) 
I concur with the result reached by the 
majority in this case but not with the con 
elusion "the source of her injury was a 
natural phenomena and a risk common to 
all in the Deadwood area ' 
* But an August 17 1984 Decision by the Depart ment of Labor alluded to a fall on ice 
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff 
and Appellee. 
v 
Kurtis Lee WEISENSTEIN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No 14588 
Supreme Court of South Dakota 
Considered on Briefs Nov 29 1984 
Decided May 1, 1985 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit 
Court, Third Judicial Circuit Codington 
County, Thomas G Ries, J , of sexual con 
tact with children under 15, and defendant 
appealed The Supreme Court Morgan J 
held that (1) victim who was five years 
old at time of incident and six at time of 
trial, was competent to testify at trial (2) 
trial court did not abuse discretion in per 
mitting State to use leading questions in its 
direct examination of victim, (3) conviction 
was supported bv sufficient evidence (4) 
there was no error in refusing to give 
defendant's proposed instructions and (5) 
eight yeir sentence was not excessive or 
disproportionate 
Affirmed 
Henderson, J , concurred in result 
1 Witnesses <3=>40(1), 15(2) 
In order to be competent witness child 
must have sufficient mental capacity to 
observe, recollect and communicate, and 
some sense of moral responsibility these 
tests are joint not several, and trial court 
must be satisfied that all four require 
ments are met SDCL 19-9-7 
2 Witnesses <s=10(l), 15(2) 
In prosecution for sexual contact with 
children under 15, victim who was five 
years old at time of incident and six at time 
of trial was competent to testify at trial as 
trial judge determined as result of search 
mg preliminary examination apart from 
jury, that victim had ability to observe and 
recollect, good capacity to communicate, 
STATE v WEISENSTEIN S D 201 
Cite as 367 N W 2d 201 (SO 1985) 
and moral understanding that he hid to tell 
truth SDCL 19-9-7 19-9-9 
3 Criminal La* <3=M1I7 
When reviewing exercise of judicial 
discretion members of Supreme Court mav 
not consider whether the\ would ha\e 
made similar ruling rather thev must con 
sider whether in view of law and circum 
stances of particular case a judicial mind 
could reasonably have reached such conclu 
sion 
4 Witnesses 0=77 79(2) 
In prosecution for sexual contact with 
children under 15 trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in its control of examination 
and determination of competence of victim 
to testify and in deciding on questions it 
wanted to ask in order to test victim s 
competence as witness and in not allowing 
either side to question victim who was fi\e 
years old at time of incident and six at time 
of trial SDCL 19-9-7 
5 Witnesses e=»2H 
In prosecution for sexual contact with 
children under 15 trial court did not abuse 
discretion in permitting State to use leid 
mg questions in its direct examination of 
victim who was five \ears old at time of 
incident and six at time of trial as State 
elicited four brief narrative responses be 
fore asking a yes or no question and State 
asked no leading questions until ex imma 
tion centered on events surrounding rh irge 
against defendant SIM L 19 11 20 
6 Criminal Law o=135 
Identity of criminal defendant is mate 
rial fact 
7 Criminal Law ®=>Y>2(\) 
Circumstantial evidence alone may 
support conviction 
8 Criminal Law <e=llr>9 2(1) 
Test on review of < rimin il < onvic hon is 
whether evidence including circumstantial 
evidence and reasonable inferences there 
from sustains rational theorv of guilt 
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C. Patrick Rowan, Appellant, v. University of Nebraska, Appellee 
No. 43227 
Supreme Court of Nebraska 
207 Neb. 588; 299 N.W.2d 774 
December 29, 1980, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
Appeal from the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation 
Court. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
HEADNOTES: 
Workmen's Compensation. As a general rule, the com-
pensation act extends to and covers workmen only while 
engaged in, on, or about the premises where their du-
ties are being performed, or where their service requires 
their presence as a pan of such service at the time of in-
jury, and during the hours of service of such workmen. 
COUNSEL: Martin A. Cannon of Matthews & Cannon, 
P.C., for appellant. 
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and John R. 
Thompson for appellee. 
JUDGES: Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, McCown, Clinton, 
Brodkey, White, and Hastings, JJ. Krivosha, C.J., dis-
senting. White, J., joins in this dissent. 
OPINIONBY: BOSLAUGH 
OPINION: [*589] [**774] This is an appeal in a pro-
ceeding under the workmen's compensation act. The 
plaintiff, who was employed as an associate professor 
of art by the defendant, was injured in an accident on 
April 10, 1978, while working in a private studio at his 
home. [**775] The plaintiff was standing on a ladder 
attempting to open a window when the window came 
loose causing him to fall to the floor. 
After the hearing before a single judge of the compen-
sation court, the plaintiff recovered an award for medical 
and hospital expenses. There was no award for tempo-
rary total disability because the defendant had continued 
to pay the plaintiff his regular salary. 
On rehearing before three judges of the compensation 
court, the judgment was reversed and the petition dis-
missed, one judge dissenting. The court found that the 
accident in which the plaintiff was injured did not arise 
out of or in the course of his employment. The princi-
pal issue upon the appeal is whether the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain this finding. 
The plaintiff was first employed by the defendant in 
1971 as a visiting instructor in art. He later became an 
assistant professor and was promoted to associate pro-
fessor in 1976. When the defendant was hired he was 
told that, in addition to his teaching duties, he was ex-
pected to do as much creative work as possible. Prior 
to February 1978, the plaintiff used a classroom at the 
university as a studio. This was not a satisfactory ar-
rangement because the classrooms were crowded, there 
was no privacy, and the lighting, heating, and cooling 
in the classroom was not satisfactory. 
[*590] In February 1978, the plaintiff purchased a 
residence that had a separate building on the property 
which could be used as a studio. The defendant had no 
objection to the plaintiff doing his creative work at his 
home and knew that he was doing so. The plaintiff had 
been working on a sculpture project described as a table 
painting series when the accident happened. 
The defendant furnished none of the materials used in 
the plaintiffs creative work, and the finished product 
was the property of the plaintiff. The only contribu-
tion from the defendant was shipping expense incurred 
in exhibiting the plaintiffs work at other institutions. 
As a general rule, the compensation act extends to and 
covers workmen only while engaged in, on, or about 
the premises where their duties are being performed, or 
where their service requires their presence as a part of 
such service at the time of injury, and during the hours 
of service of such workmen. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-
151(6) (Reissue 1978) provides; "(6) Without otherwise 
affecting either the meaning or the interpretation of the 
abridged clause, personal injuries arising out of and in 
the course of employment, it is hereby declared: Not 
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to cover workmen except while engaged in, on or about 
the premises where their duties are being performed, or 
where their service requires their presence as a part of 
such service at the time of the injury, and during the 
hours of service as such workmen, and not to cover 
workmen who, on their own initiative, leave their line 
of duty or hours of employment for purposes of their 
own." 
The evidence in this case is that the plaintiff was re-
quired to perform creative work but there was no re-
quirement that it be performed away from the premises 
of the employer. The dean of the College of Arts and 
Sciences testified that the college did not encourage art 
professors to do their art work in any particular place, 
such as their home, but merely encourages them to do the 
work. The evidence indicates [*591] that before 1978, 
the plaintiff did his creative work in classroom space 
furnished by the defendant. 
The plaintiff was in a situation similar to that of an 
employee who was required to satisfy certain require-
ments as a pan of the employment but was at liberty to 
choose the time and place where he would accomplish 
the work. In such a situation the activity performed by 
the employee is generally considered to be of but inci-
dental benefit to the employer and not covered by the 
compensation act. See Meyer v. First United Methodist 
Church, 206Neb. 607, 294N.W.2d611 (1980). 
The essential inquiry is whether the plaintiff was in-
jured as a result of a risk [**776] connected with the 
employment. In Henry v. Village of Coleridge, 147 
Neb. 686, 24 NW.2d 922 (1946), a volunteer fireman 
who slipped and fell at his home while responding to 
a fire alarm was denied compensation. The injury was 
not compensable because the accident did not have its 
origin in or was not incidental to the employment, and 
the employment did not expose the employee to a greater 
hazard than if he had not been so employed. See, also, 
Sheets v. Glenwood Telephone Co., 135 Neb. 56, 280 
NW 238 (1938). 
The plaintiff in this case was not at a place where his 
service required him to be at the time he was injured. 
The defendant was not required to assume the risk in-
cidental to the defective window in the private studio. 
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding that 
the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the 
plaintiffs employment by the defendant. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
DISSENTBY: KRIVOSHA 
DISSENT: Krivosha, C.J., dissenting. 
I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this 
case. While I find no fault with the legal propositions 
relied upon by the majority in its opinion, I do not view 
the evidence as does the majority. In my view, the record 
clearly establishes that the appellant was [*592] not only 
urged to perform creative work outside of the class-
room but was required to do so. The testimony reflects 
that the appellant's immediate supervisor, Professor Dan 
Howard, who was chairman of the department of art, 
discussed with Rowan what would be required in the 
way of creative design. He was informed by Professor 
Howard that he must do as much creative work as time 
would possibly allow and make all and any attempts to 
exhibit his work. As noted by the majority, the appellee 
considered this so significant that it paid the cost of ship-
ping the artwork to its place of exhibition. The evidence 
is without dispute that appellant was advised that faculty 
members were expected to put in somewhere in the area 
of 70 hours a week, including 18 to 21 contact hours, 
with the remaining hours devoted to creative research, 
advising, and committee assignments. Appellant testi-
fied that in his conversation with Professor Howard he 
was advised that creative activity and scholarly research 
was an integral, imperative part of his duty and a con-
dition of his employment. The dean of the college ac-
knowledged that he considered the doing of professional 
work at home a part of appellant's job as a member of 
the faculty. 
It may be true that under certain circumstances work 
performed by a college professor at home may be un-
related to his employment and, therefore, not covered 
by the workmen's compensation act; however, in this 
case, the employer did not deny that appellant was ex-
pected to perform this work, including the work done 
at home. Had the employer denied this fact, the ma-
jority opinion might be correct. But here both the em-
ployer and the employee testified that the work being 
performed at the time of the injury was considered by 
the employer as part of the employee's duties. It is dif-
ficult to see how we can find, as a matter of law, that 
the work was not a part of the employee's duties. The 
majority appears to give little credence to the require-
ment of a college professor to either [*593] "publish or 
perish." That view, in my judgment, ignores the reality 
of the matter. Had the university wished to maintain 
control over the safety of the studio facilities used by 
the faculty, it could have easily provided the appellant 
with adequate facilities and instructed him not to per-
form the required work at home. Quite to the contrary, 
it not only failed to provide him with adequate facili-
ties but encouraged him to use his home facilities in lieu 
of those which were not otherwise adequately provided 
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by the university. Many types of employment are of 
such nature that they are not performed solely within 
identifiable premises controlled and operated by the em-
ployer. It occurs to me that our decision in this case 
today, under the facts presented, does violence to our 
oftstated rule that the workmen's compensation act is 
to be construed liberally so that its beneficent purposes 
may [**777] not be thwarted by technical refinement of 
interpretation. SecHalerv. Gering Bean Co., 163Neb. 
748, 81 N.W.2d 152 (1957); Franzen v. Blakley, 155 
Neb. 621, 52 NW.2d 833 (1952). Under the facts in 
this case, I would have found that the injury arose out 
of and in the course of the appellant's employment and 
was compensable. 
White, J., joins in this dissent. 
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[2] When an application for a tem-
porary injunction is set down for a hear-
ing, the court can make a restraining order 
to maintain the status until the applica-
tion is heard on the appointed day, but no 
writ should issue until the hearing. At 
that time, the restraining order will have 
served its purpose and the question then 
is whether a temporary injunction should 
issue and continue in effect until the fur-
ther orders of the court. Francis v. Scott, 
supra; Madison Limestone Co. v. Mc-
Donald, supra. 
The fiat or order of March 13, 1970, di-
rected the register to issue an injunction 
upon complainant entering into bond. An 
injunction was issued and at the time 
of its issuance no date for a hearing had 
been set. So up to this point it appears 
that the trial judge had not made a re-
straining order to maintain the status. 
But a week later the trial judge set 
"the above-styled cause" for hearing and, 
as shown above, several subsequent orders 
of continuance referred to a hearing on 
complainant's application for temporary 
injunction. 
So we think it reasonable to assume that 
the trial court in its fiat of March 13, 
1970, actually intended to make a restrain-
ing order as authorized under § 1059, 
Title 7, Code, and to consider the writ is-
sued on that day by the register under the 
court's direction to have had the effect of 
a restraining order, although a bond was 
required of complainant. 
Furthermore, we deem it reasonable to 
assume that respondents did not consider 
that the writ which issued on March 13, 
1970, was to operate as a temporary in-
junction rather than as a restraining order. 
They did not file a motion to dissolve 
or to discharge, but participated in at least 
three separate hearings on complainant's 
application for a temporary injunction. 
After those hearings were completed, the 
trial court on July 24, 1970, ordered the 
issuance of a temporary injunction which 
he decreed should "be made permanent." 
If the writ which was issued on March 
13, 1970, had been treated as a temporary 
writ of injunction, then there would have 
been no cause to order the issuance of a 
temporary injunction. 
[3] We treat the writ which was issued 
on March 13, 1970, as having operated as 
a temporary restraining order which spent 
its force when the trial court in its de-
cree of July 24, 1970, ordered the issu-
ance of a temporary writ of injunction. 
Francis v. Scott, supra; Madison Lime-
stone Co. v. McDonald, supra. 
[4] As shown above, the trial court, 
following the hearings on complainant's 
application for temporary injunction, 
granted a permanent as well as a tempo-
rary injunction. 
The granting of a permanent injunction 
on an application for temporary injunc-
tion, as was the case here, was held to be 
reversible error in Methvin v. Hayncs, 
254 Ala. 58, 46 So.2d 815, and in Persons 
v. Summers, 274 Ala. 673, 151 So.2d 210. 
Under the cases last cited, the decree of 
the trial court is reversed in so far as it 
purports to make permanent the tem-
porary writ of injunction. 
We are not disposed on this appeal to 
reverse the decree of the trial court to the 
extent that it orders the issuance of a 
temporary injunction. In that respect the 
cause is remanded for further appropriate 
proceedings. 
Reversed in part and in part remanded. 
HEFL1N, C. J., and MERRILL, HAR-
VVOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur. 
RUSSELLVILLE GAS COMPANY v.JHJGGAR Ala. 393 
Cite as 260 So.2d 393 
London, Yancey, Clark & Allen and Max 
RUSSELLVILLE GAS COMPANY, Hudson, Birmingham, and Guin, Guin, 
Incorporated Bouldin & Porch, Russellville. for appellant. 
v
" Taylor & Taylor, Russellville, for appel-
Cecil Judson OUGGAR. lee. 
8 Olv. 49. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama. 
Aug. 25, 1971. 
KohcnriiiK Denied Sept. 22, 1071. 
Workmen's compensation proceeding. 
The Circuit Coint, Franklin County, Ken-
nedy Williams, J., awarded benefits, and 
employer appealed. The Court of Civil Ap-
peals, Wright, J., held that where liquid pe-
troleum gas truck driver, who took truck-
home with him at night and on weekends 
and who was required to respond to re-
quests for delivery after working hours, 
was not responding to calls to deliver gas or 
to call from employer directing perform-
ance of some service at time of his fall, 
which occurred when he was going from his 
house to where truck was parked in yard, 
injury sustained as result of such fall did 
not arise out of and in course of claimant's 
employment. 
Reversed and rendered. 
Certiorari denied, Ala., 260 So.2d 395. 
Workmen's Compensation <§=>7I4 
Where liquid petroleum gas truck driv-
er, who took truck home with him at night 
and on weekends and who was required to 
respond to requests for delivery after work-
ing hours, was not responding to call to de-
liver gas or to call from employer directing 
performance of some service at time of his 
fall, which occurred when he was going 
from his house to where truck was parked 
in yard, injury sustained as result of such 
fall did not, for purposes of obtaining work-
men's compensation benefits, arise out of 
and in course of claimant's employment, on 
theory that claimant's home had become 
'premises" of employer. Code of Ala., Tit. 
2<>> § 2620). 
260 So 2d— 25V2 
WRIGHT, Judge. 
This is a case involving a claim for 
Workmen's Compensation. Claimant, Cecil 
Judson Duggar, was employed as a driver 
of a liquid petroleum gas truck by Russell-
ville Gas Company, Inc. Duggar was paid 
a salary and commission. At night and on 
weekends he took the truck home with him. 
Other drivers for the company did the 
same. If a customer within his territory 
needed a delivery at night or on weekends, 
Duggar made such delivery directly from 
his home if the truck contained the neces-
sary gas. If it was emptied he refilled it 
at the plant and returned to his home He 
often took calls for deliveries at his home 
after regular working hours, lie was un-
der instruction to respond to calls day or 
night. If he left his home for any reason 
during off hours, he was to notify his em-
ployer where be could be located. In addi-
tion to a phone at his home, be bad a two-
way radio in the truck. During the past 
vear of his emplo>ment, prior to injury, he 
had probably received ten to twenty calls 
for service v\bile at his home. 
On Monday, January 12, l°7(), at about 
6:30 a. m., while going from his house to 
where the truck was parked in the yard, 
claimant slipped and fell on ice and snow on 
his driveway. The fall resulted in a broken 
hip. Complications from the injury result-
ed. Blood clots formed in the veins of the 
leg requiring an operation for removal. 
Some clots passed on to the lungs and heart 
causing infarctions. The infarctions result-
ed in damage to the lungs decreasing lung 
capacit) and affecting breathing. He was 
hospitalized foi a long JM nod «>f lime and 
was permanently disabled His hospital and 
medical expanses exceeded f'HHK). 
Upon trial, j\\f\^mcnt was rendered 
against the employer, appellant here. The 
3 9 4 Ala. 260 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
court found that the accident resulting in 
claimant's injury "arose out of and in the 
course of his employment while plaintiff 
was about to get into a liquid petroleum 
gas delivery truck at his home where the 
truck was kept during the hours when the 
defendant 's gas office was not open, and 
from which he answered calls for gas serv-
ice and made deliveries from dur ing such 
periods, and that the accident consisted of 
the plaintiff falling on ice. * * * " 
Award was made for 8 5 % permanent par-
tial disability for 300 weeks at $39.74 per 
week, or a total of $11,922.00 compensation. 
There was also awarded a total of $9,022.95 
for medical expenses. An at torney's fee 
of $3,141.81 was allowed plaintiff 's at tor-
ney. 
The amended final judgment was enter-
ed March 12, 1971. After denial of a mo-
tion for new trial, defendant below brings 
the matter here by cert iorari . 
Appellant in brief stated the sole ques-
tion presented here is whether appellee's 
injuries arose out of and in the course of 
his employment with appellant. 
The facts surrounding the injury of ap-
pellee as herein related are without mate-
rial conflict. It appears the finding of the 
court that appellee was injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment resulted from the unusual situa-
tion in which the employee at night and on 
weekends kept his delivery truck at his 
home and made deliveries, if called by cus-
tomers of appellant. As a result the court 
apparently reached the conclusion that such 
arrangement made the home of appellee the 
premises of the employer. Hav ing deter-
mined that appellee was injured by acci-
dent while on the premises of the employer, 
the court concludes that he was in the 
course of his employment. 
We cannot accept either the finding of 
fact or conclusion of law indicated by the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Title 26, Section 262( j ) , Code of Ala-
bama 1940 appears as follows: 
"Without otherwise affecting either 
the meaning or interpretation of the 
abridged clause, injuries by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, it is hereby declared: Not 
to cover workmen except while engaged 
in, or about the premises where their 
services require their presence as a part 
of such service at the time of the acci-
dent, and during the hours of service as 
such workmen, * * * " 
The words of Justice Harwood written in 
the case of Allen v. Genry, 39 Ala.App. 281, 
97 So.2d 828, and quoted by Justice Merrill 
in the case of Glens Falls Ins. Co. of Glens 
Falls, N. Y. v. Anderson, 280 Ala. 626, 197 
So.2d 276 appear as follows: 
"The word 'premises' is an elastic and 
inclusive term. Leroy Fran7, Inc., v. 
City of New Rochelle, Sup., 124 N.Y.S . 
2d 525; and it does not have one definite 
and fixed meaning, but its meaning is to 
be determined by its context and is de-
pendent on circumstances in which used, 
Gibbons v. Brandt, 7 Cir., 170 F.2d 385; 
the term may mean a room, shop, build-
ing, or any definite area. State v. Good-
child, 151 Me. 48, 115 A.2d 725." 
Justice Merrill in Glens Falls Ins. Co. of 
Glens Falls, N. Y. v. Anderson, supra, fur-
ther discusses the term "premises" and re-
lates it to control or right of control over 
the activities of the employee by the em-
ployer. We would discern no difficulty in 
applying Justice Harwood's "elastic" defi-
nition of premises to the home of appellee 
in the instant case had he been engaged in 
the service of appellant at the time of his 
injury. However, to permit the home of 
appellee to be categorically designated as 
the premises of appellant at all times when 
occupied by appellee would, in effect, pro-
vide protection of Workmen's Compensa-
tion to appellee at all times without any 
means of control of his activities by appel-
lant. He could claim compensation for fall-
ing in the bathtub. Wc do not think even 
the benevolent purposes of Workmen 's 
Compensation were intended to be extended 
so far. 
RUSSELLVILLE GAS CO. v. DUGGAR 
Cite ns 260 So 2d 395 
Ma. 395 
Had appellee been responding to a call to 
deliver gas to a customer, or to a call from 
his employer directing performance of some 
service at the time of his injury, we con-
ceive of no difficulty in placing him within 
the protection of the compensation law. 
Under the facts as presented, wc cannot do 
so. W e consider the accident suffered by 
appellee to no more have arisen out of and 
in the course of his employment than if he 
had been any workman arising in the morn-
ing and proceeding to his means of t rans-
port to his place of employment. The fact 
that his means of t ransportat ion was a ve-
hicle provided by his employer and which 
might have been used by him to perform a 
service for his employer if called during 
the weekend is merely incidental. 
The case of Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 
606, 71 So.2d 802, is in many respects sim-
ilar to the case at hand. The statute un-
der discussion there was as here—Title 26, 
Section 262( j ) . It was stated there that 
Section 262(j) is recognized as placing a 
limitation upon the phrase of "arising out 
of and in the course of his employment," 
contained in Title 26, Section 253, Code of 
Alabama 1040. With such concept in mind, 
it surely cannot be said that an unrealistic 
definition of the term "premises" may be 
allowed to negate the requirement of the 
existence of a master-servant relationship 
at the moment of the accident. The injury 
must have had its origin in some risk inci-
dent to the employment. Such risk is inci-
dent to the employment when it is connect-
ed with duties being performed under the 
obligations of such employment. 
For want of any evidence to support the 
finding of fact and the improper applica-
tion of the law to the facts, the judgment 
of the trial court must be reversed. 
The remaining assignment of error per-
tains to the setting of at torney's fee for 
plaintiff 's at torney. The reversal of the 
judgment on other grounds dispones of that 
question. For future consideration of the 
trial court on the question of attorney's 
fees, wc suggest study of Title 26, Section 
262(a) and the following cases: Sam's 
Place v. Middleton, 39 Ala.App. 481, 103 So. 
2d 812; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manas-
co, 271 Ala. 124, 123 So.2d 527. 
Reversed and rendered 
In re RUSSELLVILLE GAS CO., Inc., 
a Corporation 
Cecil Judson DUGGAR. 
Ex parte Cecil Judson DUGGAR. 
8 Dlv. 453. 
Supreme Court of Alabama. 
March 30, 1972. 
Workmen 's compensation proceeding 
The Circuit Court, Franklin County, Ken-
nedy Williams, J., awarded benefits, and 
cmplover appealed The Court of Civil Ap-
peals 260 So 2d y\^, reversed and rendered, 
and employee petitioned for certiorari. The 
Supreme Court, Heflin, (' J , held that on 
cert iorari , Supreme Court will review 
Court of Civil Appeals only on questions 
of law and not on findings of facts or 
application of law to facts, except as to 
facts as are stated in opinion of Court of 
Civil Appeals, so that a review may be ef-
fected without an examination of record 
filed in Court of Civil Appeals. 
Wri t denied. 
Certiorari C=64(l) 
On cert iorar i , Supreme Court will re-
view Court of Civil Appeals only on ques-
tions of law and not on findings of farts 
or application of law to facts, except as 
to facts as are stated in opinion of Court 
of Civil Appeals, so th.it ,i review may be 
effected without an examination of record 
filed in Court of Civil Appeals 
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TYRRELL V. STANDARD UNDERGROUND 
CABLE CO. 
District Court of Perth Amboy, New Jersey. 
June 4, 1932. 
1. Corporations <§=»407(5). 
Physician rendering services to injured 
employee at request of superintendent of 
corporation could recover against corporation 
therefor. 
2. Master and servant <§=»348. 
Compensation Statute is binding only on 
parties to statutory contract (Comp. S t Supp. 
§ **23G—1 et seq.). 
3. Master and servant G»393r/2« 
Physician rendering services to injured 
employee at request of superintendent of cor-
porate employee was not bound by Compensa-
tion Law (Corap. St. Supp. § **23&—1 et seq.). 
Action by George W. Tyrrell against the 
.Standard Underground Cable Company. 
Judgment for plaintiff. 
David T. Wilentz, of Perth Amboy, for 
plaintiff. 
John C. Stockel, of Perth Amboy, for defen-
dant. 
GOLDBERGER, J. 
The summons in this case was issued in 
1927 by the plaintiff, who is a physician in the 
-city of Perth Amboy, to recover the sum of 
$184, which represents his bill for services 
rendered to one James Kozak, an employee of 
the defendant corporation. 
The facts, as I remember them, are that in 
May, 1927, Kozak was injured in an accident 
during the course of his employment, and he 
was removed to the Perth Amboy City Hospi-
tal in an unconscious condition. Dr. Tyrrell, 
a member of the staff, was present at the time. 
A hurried examination of the patient caused 
the plaintiff to get in touch with the defend-
ant corporation through its superintendent, 
Mr. Hawley, and the plaintiff, advised Mr. 
Hawley that the patient was in a very bad 
way, and would require an unusual amount of 
care, including special nurses, in order to 
bring about a recovery. The plaintiff was re-
quested by Mr. Hawley to give all the atten-
tion necessary to bring about the recovery of 
the patient, who had been injured by reason 
of his clothes having come in contact with a 
rapidly revolving shaft, which shaft caused 
bis clothes to strangle him for several min-
utes before the machine could be stopped. The 
patient had hemorrhages of the brain and 
odema of both lungs, and a part of his flesh 
was torn away from his body. 
The defendant corporation resists payment 
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on two grounds: (1) That the agreement 
should have been in writing, and (2) that the 
plaintiff comes within the provisions of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. St. 
Supp. § **236—1 et seq.). 
[1] The defendant relies mainly upon the 
case of Moore v. Derees, 97 N. J. Law, 378,117 
A. 480. I do not agree with such contention 
because in that case the services were ren-
dered by the physician to the employee, at the 
request of the employee; but, in this case, the 
evidence is that the physician acted at the re-
quest of the defendant corporation through its 
superintendent, who was the manager in 
charge of the plant at the tune of the acci-
dent, and, as such, would have a right to bind 
the company. 
[2,3] The Compensation Statute is only 
binding upon the parties to the statutory con-
tract, and they and they only are entitled to 
its benefits and are bound by its terms. The 
plaintiff is not bound by the Compensation 
Act. Dias v. N. J. Manufacturers' Co., 132 A. 
101, 4 X. J. Misc. R. 102; Rosecrans v. Rein-
er, 4 N. J. Misc. R. 769. 
There will be a judgment for the plaintiff 
in the sum of $184, and interest from July 3, 
1927, in the sum of $54.30. 
VAN DEVANDER v. WEST SIDE M. E. 
CHURCH. 
No. 216. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
June 2, 1932. 
Master and servant ®=>375(l). 
Where minister strained his back while 
removing barrel of ashes from cellar of par-
sonage, accident held not to "arise out of em-
ployment." 
Accident did not "arise out of the em-
ployment/' since the minister was per-
forming an act personal to himself and his 
family, and not connected with his employ-
ment as a minister, for carrying ashes is 
not incidental to that office, directly or in-
directly; contention that the church im-
posed upon the minister the care of the 
parsonage not being sustainable, since the 
care of a dwelling house ordinarily falls 
upon the occupant and does not have to be 
imposed. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Arising Out of Employment," see Words 
and Phrases.] 
$=»For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER m ail Key Number Digests and Indexes 
764 N. J. 160 ATLANTIC REPORTER 
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law by Don J. Van Devander, opposed 
by the West Side M. E. Church, employer. To 
review a judgment of the Compensation Bu-
reau awarding compensation, the employer 
brings certiorari. 
Award set aside. 
Argued January term, 1932, before 
TRENCHARD, DALY, and DONGES, JJ. 
McDermott, Enright & Carpenter, of Jersey 
City, for prosecutor. 
Miller & Barowitz, of Jersey City, for re-
spondent 
PER CURIAM. 
This writ brings up a determination of the 
Compensation Bureau awarding compensa-
tion to the respondent for injuries alleged to 
have been sustained as the result of an acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of his 
employment by prosecutor. 
The respondent is a Methodist minister, and 
was assigned by the bishop to arid employed 
as pastor by the prosecutor, West Side M. E. 
Church. His stated salary was $3,450 per an-
num, and he was housed in the church parson-
age (and was apparently required to live 
there), for which the sum of $700 was deduct-
ed from his salary, making a cash payment of 
$2,750. He was furnished no janitor service 
for the parsonage, and was required to do all 
housework, groundkeeping, and care of the 
furnace himself. On November 11,1930, while 
removing a barrel of ashes from the cellar of 
the parsonage, he strained his back. The 
question presented here is whether or not thia 
accident was one arising out of and in the 
course of the employment. 
The only testimony, outside of the medical 
evidence, was that of the petitioner. He tes-
tified that he was required to keep the house 
in condition for use by the members of the 
congregation, and that, in fact, it was used for 
weddings, christenings, and other parish meet-
ings. 
We are inclined to think that it was error to 
hold that the accident arose out of the employ-
ment Petitioner was performing a household 
duty for his own benefit which he would have 
been required to perform if he lived in a house 
owned by himself. In Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. 
J. Law, 72, 86 A. 458, 460, the act was said to 
cover risks "which are within the ordinary 
scope of the particular employment in which 
the workman is engaged." Now the employ-
ment here was that of a minister. Carrying 
ashes is certainly not incidental to that office, 
directly or indirectly. Petitioner takes the 
position that the church imposed certain addi-
tional duties, namely, care of the parsonage. 
But it does not seem that this is so. Care of 
a dwelling house ordinarily falls upon the oc-
cupant and does not have to be so "imposed." 
What the church did was to refuse to furnish 
service which would relieve him of this bur-
den. 
The case of Lauterbach v. Jarett, 1S9 Apa 
Div. (N. Y.) 303, 17S N. Y. S. 4S0, 4S1, seems to 
be in point There a janitress who was fur-
nished with living quarters in the building 
she cared for was injured by the falling of 
plaster while eating in her own apartment 
It was said: "In no proper sense can it be 
said that she was janitress of her own apart-
ment merely because it happened to be a part 
of the building of which she was the jani-
tress." 
It was also said: "She was in the building 
in a dual capacity. Her family was domiciled 
in one of the apartments. Her personal rela-
tions to her family were distinct and separate 
from her relations to her employers." 
This reasoning is sound. In the instant 
case we think that at the time of the accident 
the respondent was performing an act person-
al to himself and his family, and not connect-
ed with his employment as a minister. 
The award is set aside, with costs. 
FIRST NAT. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, 
PA., V. STONELEY. 
No. 425. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
May 27, 1932. 
Judgment <§=»I38(3). 
Showing in respect to attorney's lack of 
notice of trial day, together with defense, re-
quired opening of default judgment on note. 
Affidavit of merits and answer were duly 
filed, and defense alleged that defendant 
had not signed, executed, or delivered 
notes in question, in addition to which de-
fendant's counsel, in affidavit filed on ap-
plication for rule to show cause, explained 
in great detail reason for nonappearance; 
that he had relied on clerk in circuit or 
opposing counsel, nnwarrantedly perhaps, 
to give him timely notice of trial day; that 
he received no notice; and that default 
judgment against defendant was result 
Suit by the First National Bank of Phila-
delphia, Pa., against Ernest Stoneley. On 
defendant's rule to show cause why default 
judgment should not be set aside. 
Judgment opened, and a new trial granted. 
Argued May term, 1932, before TRENCH-
ARD, CASE, and BROGAN, JX 
$=»For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
